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Since European Union enables free mobility between its Members States, certain EU 
countries have become attractive destinations because of the working conditions and/or 
employment opportunities. As a result, some EU nations have experienced the inflow of 
large amount of immigrants and disturbances on their labor markets. 
With regard to this, the concept of Immigration Surplus that proposes that phenomenon of 
immigration can trigger a process of redistribution of wealth that could enhance the level of 
production and increase the national income can be applied for analyzing these processes. 
In addition, research literature suggests that deeper integration of immigrants into host 
countries can lead to higher levels of economic success. Thus, high levels of integration 
may lead to an increase in the Immigration Surplus of the host countries. This Master thesis 
deals with the specific aspects of immigration and the effects that the integration of 
immigrant groups may have in the national income during the years of 2007 to 2012. 
Through an appropriate analysis, this research attempts to provide a description of the 
immigration phenomenon in the EU, the consequences of it in the labor markets and the 
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1. Introduction  
According to the Constitution of the European Union, the territory of the EU Member 
States is regarded as an “area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, 
and as an internal market where competition is free and undistorted” (EU Commission, 
2004). In order to reach this status, the EU Commission established internal and 
external objectives that should trace the path that each member country should follow 
to define and implement their policies.  
Article I-3 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) provides the 
following definition: “The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific 
and technological advance” (EU Commission, 2004). Through this legal framework and 
with these kinds of objectives the Union potentiated the market, enhanced economic 
growth and established itself as a world economic power. 
Due to the provisions described above, several EU Member States have become 
attractive destinations for migrants (both EU nationals and nationals of the third 
countries). Even though the reasons why people decide to migrate to the EU and 
within the EU are diverse, the European Commission (2011) denoted in the document 
“Migrants in Europe. A statistical portrait of the first and second generation” that since 
the year 1995 migration for work issues and employment search have become the 
main reasons for moving from the home countries (EU Commission, 2011). Thus, 
there are mostly economic reasons why labor force decides to seek higher revenues 
and better working conditions in foreign labor markets. 
Strielkowski (2012) affirms that immigrants choose host countries according to the 
ability to absorb the additional labor supply that they can provide. As a result, certain 
EU Member States have experienced the inflow of large amount of immigrants and 
disturbances in their labor markets. The migration policy makers, labor associations, 
trade unions and general society confront the constant dilemma of the consequences 
of allowing labor migrants to enter their countries and interact in their society. A 
common concern about this phenomenon and that might shape the policies 
implemented regard that immigrants come into a country without any contribution to 
society and that may only take advantage of the conditions of the labor market.  
This Master thesis deals with the specific aspects of immigration that can describe the 




member states in the EU. Is immigration beneficial for enhancing economic growth? 
Do locals benefit from the mobility of foreign workers or just the immigrants perceive 
the positive effects? Does this amount in labor supply just represent a threat for the 
employment in the long run? These research questions can shape the analysis and 
provide pattern for locating the research within the European space because of the 
economic importance of the region and the heavy inflow of migrants into it (e.g. the 
recent Lampedusa incident). 
For practical purposes, the immigration indicators chosen for the analysis will be 
limited and will just include foreign-born or third country nationals, with a legal 
status, that reside in the countries described in the “Migrant Integration Policy Index”. 
This thesis also deals with the impact on migration, especially labor migration, on the 
economic and social development of the host countries (represented in this work by 
the EU Member States and other selected countries). Migration issues have 
represented a point of interest of numerous research papers and books; although 
certain inconsistencies can be observed in the results from study to study, most of 


















2. Theoretical background 
Immigration surplus and Migrant Integration Policy Index 
When it comes to migration and its impact on wages, there are several sources that 
might be taken into account. For instance, using a meta-database that consists of 348 
wage effects collected from 18 studies, Longhi – Nijkamp – Poot (2005) analyzed the 
general effect of migration in native wages. They concluded that from the percentage 
variation in wage of a native worker with respect to a 1 percentage point increase in 
the ratio of immigrant labor force over national workers is just about a decrease of 
0.119%. The effect was lower in countries inside EU while in the United States is 
higher. 
Furthermore, Lemos - Portes (2008) analyzed the impact of one of the largest 
migration inflows in the UK during the years 2004 to 2006. The empirical analysis 
found little hard evidence that reveals the entrance of these groups contributed to the 
fall in wages or raise the unemployment. In another related investigation, Lemos – 
Portes (2008) analyzed the impact of migration from the new EU Member States on 
native workers. The empirical study showed some results about the correlation 
between the immigration inflow and the unemployment rate. A one percentage point 
increase in the proportion of the migrant labor force (between the working age 
population) might decrease the unemployment rate in the EU Member States by 0.015 
percentage points. Nonetheless, the estimated coefficient also resulted as 
insignificantly different from zero. 
The findings that reveal the investigations, and is of critical importance, is defined that 
even when the effects of immigration to foreign labor markets are marginal or 
minimal, these might lead to positive results, contrary to the concerns of policy 
makers. As mentioned in “The impact of migration from the new European Union 
Member States on native workers” (Lemos – Portes, 2008) actual labor markets can 
be able by now to show proper flexibility and speed of adjustment in case of 
disturbances. 
This Master thesis will employ the co-called “Immigration Surplus” designed by 
George Borjas (1994) that emerged with the purpose of describing the consequences 
of the labor mobility process through the effects on labor markets. This concept has 
been chosen for this research because it can concisely reflect the measure of the 
positive or negative effects of immigration at the aggregate level of national income. 
Even when the methodology used by Borjas could be a bit robust, it represents one of 




Likewise, is intended to analyze the economic implications of the various levels of 
integration in the member states of the European Union in regard to the effects of 
labor immigration on the local economy. This aims to explain whether the benefits or 
damages caused, and expressed by the Immigration Surplus, can be enhanced or 
reduced with high levels of social and economic integration. 
In a lack of a common immigration policy frame between Member States, the aspect of 
integration of immigrants present different scenarios among countries of the region. 
In some nations, immigrants might experience greater difficulties to interact, work 
and/or adapt than in others. Thus, the inability to coordinate efficient integration 
strategies can lead to a situation of inefficient allocation of resources by the public 
institutions (Trbola, 2011) and a limitation to the possible positive benefits raised by 
immigrants. 
These barriers of integration can contemplate issues such as complications while 
entering the labor market, higher costs of migration and lower disposition of 
immigrants to receive lower wages because the cost of stay in the country is high. 
The Research and Evaluation Group of DTI Associates and Levine A. (2004) prepared 
a collection of five research papers for the Bureau of International Labor Affairs and 
the United States Department of Labor. In these papers is described the role of 
immigrant integration in the labor force in regions such as North America and Europe. 
It is also addressed cases where the integration of foreign workers into the local labor 
force represents a way to enhance the market or to compensate a social issue that 
might harm the economy in the future (e.g. the aging condition of the European labor 
force). 
In “Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Canada – Existing Services and New 
Initiatives” (Ruddick, 2004) is described Canada’s immigration program as an active 
measure to integrate refugees and immigrants to economy and society. Even when 
there were signs in the early 90’s that showed an increase in the rate of low incomes, 
probably related to the foreign worker inflows, the second half of the 90’s decade 
revealed an improvement in the economic growth. Initiatives such as foreign 
credential recognitions, language training, internships, bridging programs and others 
focused their efforts to help immigrants to access labor markets and thus contribute 
to the market and economy growth (Ruddick, 2004). 
Differently from other countries with high immigration levels, the Unites States has no 
explicit immigrant integration policies or programs. In “The Economic Integration of 
Immigrants in the United States: A Review of the Literature” (Goździak – Martin, 
2004), the authors explain that even when the country lacks of immigrant integration 




immigrants to the United States are sponsored by family members or employers who 
take a principal role in ensuring their adaptation to the new country” (Goździak – 
Martin, 2004). In this way, the labor market has a peculiar characteristic and is so 
flexible that the immigrants could easily find opportunities to be employed and 
integrate at certain level to the society. Upward mobility between jobs and positions 
also characterizes the American labor market, thus the immigrants have more 
possibilities to increase their incomes. Certainly, this case serves as an example where 
integration is not properly in charge of a public institution but still denotes the 
benefits the can be enhanced with it; is important to remember that this is a rare 
characteristic of the labor market in the United States. 
“Migration, Labor Markets, and Integration of Migrants: An Overview for Europe with 
a Comparison to the U.S.” (Münz, 2004) details the aging issue in Europe. Longevity 
and low fertility rates characterize this population where domestic working 
populations seem to be eventually shrinking. Additionally, this condition also 
increases the demand of low skilled workers. “Recruitment of migrants from third 
countries is increasingly appearing as the main way of responding to the growing 
demand for medium and high skilled labor. After 2010, many countries will have to 
develop pro-active migration policies to meet burgeoning demographic and economic 
needs” (Münz – Fellow, 2004). In the short term the recruitment of immigrant labor 
force from East European countries will be able to compensate the aging issue, later 
the EU Member States will appeal to labor resources in third countries. Thus, if the EU 
intends to maintain economic growth in the area might need to deploy integration 
strategies that encourage migrants to work within the Member States by offering 
them sufficiently attractive conditions. These integration strategies can include 
certain selection parameters of immigrants that match with the complementarity 
condition depicted in the Immigration Surplus, thus, benefits from the migrant inflows 
can be achieved. “The migrants most likely to help match shortages of labor and skills 
and with the best chances to integrate are probably those who are able to adapt to 
changing conditions, by virtue of their qualifications, experience and personal abilities” 
(Münz, 2004). 
 
To measure levels of integration in different countries will be used the “Migrant 
Integration Policy Index” (Niessen - Huddleston - Citron - Geddes - Jacobs, 2010). The 
MIPEX is a recent tool that allows measuring and comparing diverse levels of 
integration with regard to different migration policy areas such as labor market 
mobility, education and access to long term residence between others. With the data 
contained in this index, the impact of integration in the immigration surplus might be 
explained and then used to generate advices that might improve integration and thus 




2.1 Immigration Surplus 
 
The increase in the migration flow of migrants and immigrants in the European Union 
have led to the fact that countries should confront a change in the composition of 
societies with different kinds and levels of education, skills and labor preferences 
between other important cultural factors. These heterogeneous societies have 
generated for several years the discussion about the economic implications and the 
benefits or damages that this kind of activity can generate in the welfare of the 
nationals and the nation’s macroeconomic indicators. 
It is mainly because of this characteristic of diversity that the complementarity 
between the labor force and capital can arise and bring benefits to the host economies 
where immigrants reside. 
These benefits can be measured in monetary terms, for instance in the form or the so-
called “immigration surplus” developed by George Borjas (1994). 
In order to understand the concept of immigration surplus, we should settle the 
research in a host competitive economy with market clearing framework, without 
externalities and that allows the free movement of factors of production from one 
country to another so that the welfare and efficiency could increase. For practical 
purposes of this thesis, it will be ignored the negative effects that immigration might 
cause when the host country is facing a problem of structural unemployment. 
This thesis will follow the same methodology implemented in “The Economic Benefits 
from Immigration” (Borjas, 1994) to compute the immigration surplus from the EU 
member states. Borjas (1994) establishes a production function with just two inputs; 
labor force and capital (see equation 2.1). 
Equation 2.1 Production Function 
         
 Capital (K) 
 Labor (L) 
Then, this labor force is segmented in native workers and immigrant workers. 
Equation 2.2 Segmentation of labor force 
      
 Native labor force (N) 




Additionally, it must be assumed all workers are perfectly substitutes between each 
other, capital and labor force supplies are perfectly inelastic and there are constant 
returns on scale. The price of each factor is equal to its individual marginal 
production, where    and    represent the price of each capital and labor unit 
respectively at the n time. Finally, the entire output of the production function is 
entirely distributed to the workers and the owners of the capital. 
Once the assumptions of Borjas model have been set, is necessary to first describe the 
equilibrium before the arrival of the immigrant labor force. The capital and the native 
labor force produce certain    amount of national income in the time 0. Thus, it can 
be represented the production function for the time period 0 in the following way: 
Equation 2.3 National income accruing to natives 
           
Since the capital supply is inelastic the total output of this closed economy is the area 
delimited by the marginal product labor line. Figure 2.1 shows the area (A,B,N,0) that 
represents the national output of the economy in the time period 0. 
Now it should be explain the changes in the equilibrium after the arrival of the 
immigrant labor force. Since it has been already assumed, the labor force supply is 
perfectly inelastic and all workers are perfect substitutes between each other, the 
entry of this group will result in a shift to the right of the labor supply curve. 
Figure 2.2 shows the changes in the wage and employment levels after the entry of the 
foreign born and third-country nationals.  The two scenarios (before and after the 
arrival of immigrants) can now be compared and in this way visualize the changes in 
national income, wage and employment.  As a result of the shift, the level of wage will 
decrease from   to  , this means the level of employment will increase from N to L. 
Now the two scenarios can be compared and analyze the changes in national income, 
wage and employment.  As a result of the shift, the national income will increase and 
now it will be represented by the area (A,C,L,0). The level of employment will increase 
from N to L. The level of wage will decrease1 from    to    because part of the 
national income is now directly distributed to immigrants; this redistribution is 
represented by the area (D,C,L,N). The immigration surplus, that represents the gains 
                                                          
1
 A key assumption in Borjas theory lies on the perfect inelasticity of the labor supply curve. In the case of a 
perfect elastic demand curve, the entry of immigrants into the host economy won’t cause any changes in 
the level of wages so this group would receive the full additional production while the natives would not 
benefit in any way from the phenomenon of migration. By using this example it can be shown the effect of 





(or losses) resulting from the changes on the labor market caused by migration, is 
delimited by the area (B,C,D).  
The gains can be raised because the market wage matches the marginal productivity 
of the last unit of labor hired and the immigrants bring the possibility to increase the 
national income by more than the cost of their employment. Even when the natives 
face a fall in their wages and a decrease in their welfare, the negative effect is not as 
big as the increase in the income that the owners of the capital will experience. 
Figure 2.1 Market equilibrium before the entrance of immigrants 
 





To measure the approximate value of immigration surplus from the time 0 to time 1 
we can compute the value of its area in the figure 2.2. This area can be expressed as: 
Equation 2.4 Immigration surplus 
                     
 
 
           
Borjas reformulated the equation in order to express the immigration surplus as the 
fraction of the national income that was enhanced by the foreign and third-country 
nationals. To achieve this expression we must assume that               . 
Equation 2.5 Immigration surplus as a fraction of national income 





































     
 Labor’s share of national income (s). 
 Labor’s elasticity of factor price (e). 
 Fraction of the labor force that is foreign born or third-country national (m). 
2.1.1 Elasticity of factor price 
 
The size of the immigration surplus will be conditioned by the elasticity factor price of 
labor and the increase in the national income will react proportionally to it. The 
greater the changes in wage due to an increase in the labor supply, the greater will be 
the resulting immigration surplus. Inversely, if the wages are not so sensitive to 
changes in the labor supply it will be hard to increase the income. 
It is also important to remark that both production inputs (L,K) should have a 
complementary relation rather than to be perfect substitutes one of another; 
immigrant labor force must complement the capital owned by natives to achieve a 
positive reaction. If capital and labor complement each other means the elasticity of 
factor price is large (absolute value) and natives will experiment bigger benefits from 




one of another the migration surplus will be small and natives will hardly benefit from 
the immigrants. 
2.1.2 Redistribution of wealth 
 
Through the concept of immigration surplus is possible to discern one of the main 
ideas that shapes this research, the entry of migrants to an economy that offers them 
employment opportunities may result in economic benefits for the general economy.  
Another key finding in Borjas’ research is related to the redistribution of wealth. Even 
if the immigration surplus represents a small increase in the national income, the 
amount of wealth that is transferred from the native workforce to the owners of the 
capital occurs in a larger quantity. 
Figure 2.2 showed the fraction of the total income that is directly transferred to the 
foreign born and third-country nationals (area (B,C,D)). It also showed the fraction of 
wealth that is transferred from the labor force to the capital owners. Area 
(          represents this redistribution of wealth. 
Below is expressed this redistribution as a fraction of the total national income: 
Equation 2.6 Wealth redistribution expressed as fraction of national income 
                              
 
           
                                
 
           
 
  
   
The enhancement in the national income and the redistribution of wealth open a 
range of possibilities for migration policy makers. The use of this model may generate 
new immigration strategies that stress on distributional topics instead of efficiency 
ones. 
2.1.3 Limitations from the calculation of the Immigration Surplus 
 
The Immigration Surplus faces various limitations due to the number of assumptions 
used to calculate it. In the following section will be presented some of the cases where 






a) Immigrants augment the stock of capital: 
Let's suppose the case where the immigrant labor force entries the host country 
and each of these owns a certain amount of capital. After their arrival, the labor 
supply force will increase as well as the amount of capital used in the production 
function. Since the changes in the labor market had been compensated in some 
way by the new capital, the adjustments in wage won’t be so sensitive and the 
resulting immigration surplus won’t be as large as following Borjas assumption. 
The immigration benefits could be nullified if the capital increases in the same 
proportion than the increase of the labor force. 
 
b) Correlation between the native’s wage and immigrants ‘share: 
Borjas presumes that the existing correlation between the natives' wages and the 
immigrant share should not exhibit a small impact in the opportunity of foreigners 
to access the native earnings. This kind of correlation might serve as a measure of 
acceptance of the local labor market to the immigrants, however, if the owners of 
capital and employers are still interested to improve their production through 
lower labor costs, migrants will continue having access to this native earning no 
matter the level of correlation estimated. 
 
c) Labor unions: 
The role of unions could significantly alter the principles of the immigration 
surplus. With the entry of immigrants into the host economy, wages must be 
reduced in order to generate the wealth redistribution and an increase of national 
income. However, unions will hardly allow a fall in wages due to an increase in 
labor supply. If the mobility of the factors of production consents the new labor 
market conditions, the native workers must choose between accept the new 
salaries or quit their jobs. This scheme could lead to an increase in the 
unemployment rate and general discontent of nationals. Once the native 
population is not pleased with their labor market condition, they will demand 
changes in the immigration policies that can protect the native’s welfare. Finally, 
the changes in the policies might restrict the creation of an immigration surplus in 
the host economy. 
 
d) Workers are perfect substitutes one of another: 
The assumption that all workers are perfect substitutes for each other alienates 
the model from the reality of the labor markets. In addition, it limits the potential 






2.1.4 Variation in the marginal utility labor force 
 
Even though the model is developed over the assumption of constant return on scale, 
is interesting to understand the possible effects of variations in marginal productivity 
because of immigrants.  
The diversity and complementarity of factors of production (as mentioned previously) 
provides the opportunity to generate an increase in the returns on the aggregate even 
if the firm has constant return on scale. The different abilities between native worker 
and immigrant workers might enhance the skills of both groups through a “pick up” 
knowledge process in which the firms and owners of capital will benefit without 
paying for it.  
It should be also considered that immigrants are economic agents that interact in the 
markets of goods and services, not only in the labor market. Thus, their stay in a 
foreign country should raise the demand for goods and thus shift the labor demand 
curve to the right. Figure 2.3 shows this shift. 
Let’s refer to these kinds of phenomenon as “external effects” just like Borjas did it. 
To represent the “external effects” in the production function assume the production 
function is set in the following way: 
Equation 2.7 Production function with external effects 
           
 
 
 Representative firms output (    
 Capital (K) 
 Labor (L) 
 Aggregate output in economy (    
 Percentage increase in the marginal product of labor as a result of an 
increase of 1 percent in aggregate output (γ). 
The shift of the labor marginal productivity curve to the right because of the external 
effects results in the increase of the national income. The area (B,C,D) represents the 
immigration surplus under external effects; meanwhile, the area (A,B,E,F) measures 







Figure 2.3 Equilibrium after the entrance of immigrants under external effects 
 
The immigration surplus under external effects can be computed also as a fraction of 
the national income, equation 2.1.3 expresses this calculation: 
Equation 2.8 Immigration surplus under external effects 





     
   
   




The ideas about the external effects postulated by Borjas (1994) positive led to 
positive results and a very different posture towards immigration from the usual and 
negative one. Unfortunately there isn’t still enough evidence to support these external 
effects. 
2.1.5 Immigrant skill differentiator 
 
In the same way it was addressed the issue of external effects, the differentiating skills 
will be added to the model to resemble the analysis of the effects of immigrations as 
close as possible to the reality. 
In this section it will be introduced into the production function two kinds of workers. 
Fraction of the national income 
distributed to immigrants. (B,C,D) 
Change in the national income of natives 




Equation 2.9 Production Function with skill differentiator 
           
 Skilled workers (    
 Unskilled workers (    
The role of complementarity between the factors of production will now assess the 
consequences if native/immigrant skilled workers go together with immigrant/native 
unskilled workers into the labor market. The immigration surplus will arise in the 
cases the incoming groups of migrants differ from the skill composition of the native 
labor population. In the case both groups share the same level of skills, the native 
community won’t be benefit from the no nationals. Thus, the magnitude of the 
immigration surplus will also depend on how different is the immigrant labor force. 
Equation 2.10 Immigration surplus as fraction of national income with skill 
differentiator 





          
 
  
       
 
         
 Share of national incomer accruing to skilled labor force      
 Elasticity of factor price of skilled labor force       
 Fraction of skilled immigrant labor force (β) 
 Fraction of skilled native labor force (б) 
Skill differentiator in the workforce can be an important tool for immigration policy 
makers. Through this knowledge they can able to identify what type of immigrant 
population can maximize the immigration surplus and thus provide incentives to that 
specific group. 
2.1.6 Immigration Surplus conclusions 
 
The concepts presented in Borjas’ paper reveal the potential benefits resulting from 
the phenomenon of migration and the implementation of appropriate migration 
policies. These concepts may serve as a breakeven point of paradigms about negative 
effects of immigrants into the host nation.  
Understanding the complementary property of the factors of production, it can be 
structured a framework to identify the enhances of immigration and the type of 




either through differentiation of skills, external effects or changes in labor market 
conditions. 
The phenomenon of immigration can be interpreted as a process of redistribution of 
wealth that could enhance the level of production and increase the national income. It 
is possible that, during the process in which wages and labor supply find their new 
market equilibrium, certain labor sectors may experiment a decrease in welfare, 
however, in the long run the total population should benefit from immigration 
because of the expansion of the total demand. 
2.2. Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 
 
Through an appropriate integration framework toward foreign born and third-
country nationals, countries can structure a legal environment where these groups 
might contribute in a better way to the host country well-being. Factors such as access 
to employment, education, security and others can encourage the immigrants to 
interact with local society and thus contribute to the development of this. 
MIPEX is an index that serves as measure of integration policies in more than thirty 
countries2 of the world. Is also used as a reference guide to evaluate, compare and 
improve the legal immigrant’s situation in the host countries. 
The index contains 148 policy indicators that describe the opportunities a legal 
immigrant has to participate economically and politically in the host society. Through 
this analysis the index can detail if the foreign born or third-country nationals are 
treated with the same rights as the natives. 
2.1.1 Composition of the index 
 
MIPEX analyses seven policy areas to elaborate the index; labor market mobility, 
family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to 
nationality and anti-discrimination.  
Then, these seven policy areas are divided into 35 policy indicators. Every policy 
indicator consists in a question related to a specific area that composes the MIPEX. 
The benchmark for every policy indicator identifies the highest European or 
international standard that guarantees the equal rights, responsibilities and 
                                                          
2
 Countries: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, 




opportunities for all the residents in a country (nationals, foreign born or third-
country nationals). Thus, each of the questions must be answered using the following 
scheme: 
a) 3 points – The policy area is graded with the maximum of points because it 
meets the highest standards for equal treatments for all the population. 
b) 2 points – The policy area lies halfway compared to the highest standards. 
c) 1 point – The policy area is graded with the minimum of points because is the 
furthest from the highest standards. If a country does not have policies on a 
specific policy indicator the grade of 1 is given as default. 
Next, within each of the seven policy areas, the scores are averaged together to give a 
four dimension score that examines the same aspect of the policy. Then, these four 
dimension scores are averaged together to compute the respective policy area scores 
for each of the seven policy areas per country. Finally, these are averaged together one 
last time which leads to the overall scores for each country. To develop a ranking table 
or compare policies between countries, the initial 1-3 scale is transformed into a 0-
100 scale where 100% is the top score. 
2.1.2 MIPEX developers 
 
The research is in charge of the British Council and the Migration Policy Group. In the 
process of gathering the information participate 37 level organizations (non-
governmental organizations, foundations, universities, and research institutes) as well 
as the international partners affiliated to MIPEX in the countries around the world3. 
In contrast to any index, the MIPEX is based on public laws, policies and researches 
conducted by independent academics and practitioners in migration, education and 
anti-discrimination laws that evaluate the condition of each policy indicator. Each of 
the scores is then peer-reviewed by a second expert in the field. 
2.1.3 MIPEX action plan 
 
MIPEX intends to show with the index to the participating countries how to create a 
more favorable legal environment immigrant. Any recommendation made by the 
organization should lead a plan to encourage the integration of non-national groups 
and a suggestion through which no-nationals may increase the economic development 
of the local population. 
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Since migration policies are important factors that can influence the process of 
integration, the analysis made can be used as a starting point to evaluate, fix or 
improve the conditions of immigrant groups through mechanisms that benefit both 
immigrant groups and natives. 
2.1.4 Description of main policy areas 
 
a) Labor market mobility: 
The policy indicator corresponding to this seeks to measure the possibilities that a 
legal immigrant can access the local labor markets with the same rights that a native 
worker. 
The individual, whether foreign born or third-country national, should be able to 
apply to any job either in the public sector or the private sector since the first day of 
stay in the host country.  
The complete labor mobility represents that employers recognize the abroad 
qualifications of the worker and the opportunity to access to the specific training or 
knowledge if the position requires it. 
Once hired, the employee should enjoy the same benefits as wage, social security and 
compensations that any national would receive if he will be performing the same 
working activities. In the same way, the immigrant worker is also forced to face the 
same responsibilities as a native like the pay of taxes. 
The country should be able to benefit from the specific skills of the immigrants and if 
it is applied an appropriate integration strategy for these groups. 
b) Family reunion: 
It is assumed that families that are successfully reunited have the socio-cultural 
stability to participate more actively in society. Thus, the policy indicators for "Family 
Reunion" used in the MIPEX evaluate the rights and responsibilities that a family has 
when they move from one country to another. 
If the immigration process is not fraudulent or it represents a security threat for the 
host country, the migration dependence should give a rapid and positive resolution 
for the permission requested by the family entering the nation. Countries with a high 
level of integration and family reunion facilitate access to schools, jobs and social 






Any child coming from a family of legal immigrants must have access to the education 
systems in the host country from the level of kindergarten up to university. 
The policy indicators in the area of “Education” measure the viability that the children 
of immigrants receive the same education and social programs as any national with 
the same socio-economic background. 
d) Political Participation: 
Countries that have a high level of MIPEX in the area of "Political Participation" 
evaluates of the newcomers as well as nationals enjoy from the same civil liberties. 
These attributes bring the overall population the opportunity to participate in the 
democratic processes. 
If legal immigrants are well integrated to the political system of the society, they 
should have the chance to vote in the local elections, have the same political rights, 
access to the public information and contribute to the political decisions. 
e) Long Term Residence: 
After some time of living under the legal framework in a foreign country, the 
immigrants should have the right to decide for themselves whether to permanently 
settle there.  The “Long Term Residence” policy indicators elaborated by the MIPEX 
intend to explain the availability of foreigners to exercise this right. 
This long term resident status provides the immigrants with a better stability and a 
more attractive working and studying profile for the employers or educations 
institutes. 
f) Access to Nationality: 
In the cases the migrant that has decided to settle down in a host country and also 
expect fully participation in the public life can exercise the right to request the 
nationality of the country. Several countries demand from the immigrants a certain 
period of time living inside the country, to have no recent criminal records and to pass 
basic national language test as well as citizenship courses. If the foreign born or third-
country national accomplishes these requirements, he/she should be able to get the 
nationality. The “Access to Nationality” policy indicator expressed in the MIPEX 







Immigrant groups are exposed within the host country to be victims of an act of 
racism. These events can be triggered by issues of race, religion or nationality and 
may occur in different circumstances such as work, housing, schools, public service 
institutions and social protection between others.  
 Victims of these illegal acts are empowered to present the case to the authorities and 
seek for justice to compensate the damage. The authorities is enforced to analyze the 
case, sanction the one who committed the fault and look the way to compensate the 
total damage to the victim. 
MIPEX stresses on the importance of this kind of acts and how do they block the 
process of integration of immigrants. Thus, the “Anti-Discrimination” policy indicator 
evaluates the process through which the laws protect migrants against this and how 
do local authorities enforce to compensate the immigrant and sanction the actor. 
2.1.5 MIPEX conclusions 
 
The MIPEX, although is recent and uses a new methodology, represents one of the few 
existing tools that tries to measures the complex process of integration toward 
migrants. The results of integration expressed in The British Council Group and 
Migrant Policy Group’s publications for 2010 and 2007 provide the reader with a 
concise and comprehensive status of migrants in various nations of the world. Also, it 
is possible to observe specifically the facilities or difficulties in each country and that 
will face by anyone intending to migrate to the territory. 
This index represents a fundamental tool for this research that seeks to link the 
economic benefits provided by immigrants to the host nation with integration levels 
of these individuals into the local society. Subsequently, it will be presented the 
econometric models that contain the results of the MIPEX for each specific policy 
during 2007 and 2010. This information will be linked to the immigration surplus 







3. Hypothesis, research methodology 
and empirical model   
The empirical part of this Master thesis focuses on two major aspects. The first is to 
analyze the potential benefits (or disadvantages) that immigrants can bring to the 
economic growth in a host country; as explained in chapter two, we will use the 
concept of "Immigration Surplus" (IS) developed by Borjas to refer to these effects. 
The second aspect attempts to explain the possible relationship between the 
indicators of social and economic integration of immigrants in a host nation and the 
immigration surplus. 
This chapter will first describe the main hypotheses that give shape to the research 
and that will be intended to prove through an econometric analysis. Second, it will list 
the selected countries for the research and the defined time period during which the 
data was comprised. Later, the collection and computation of variables contained in 
the data base will be described in detail. Similarly, the Bayesian Model Averaging 
method is explained as a way to select the relevant variables that could explain the 
link between the IS and the integration of immigrants. Finally, the preliminary 
econometric base model is constructed in order to attempt to measure the correlation 
between the two theoretical concepts described in the previous chapter. 
3.1 Hypotheses 
 
The planning and implementation of migration policies usually generates discussions 
due to the social and economic implications of the inclusion of new individuals into a 
market. This inclusion of people and their degree of acceptance in the host country 
can lead to different results which are of great interest for this research.  
Borjas (1994) suggests that national economies can obtain economic benefits with the 
incorporation of immigrant workers into its labor markets. To complement this idea, 
certain existent literature suggests that the level of integration of immigrants in a 
labor market and society is somehow related to the economic performance of these 
groups and the economic behavior of the host country (Zimmerman, 2007). Danzer 
and Ulku (2008) give additional support to this idea and affirm that deeper 
integration may lead to higher chances to achieve economic success and thus enhance 




Thus, the idea of a possible enhancement of the national income through the inclusion 
of immigrant labor forces into host labor markets motivated the hypotheses 
expressed in this Master thesis. 
It is also important to denote that the legal admission of these individuals to the labor 
market should represent to the public finances new contributors as well as new users 
with access to social services. Danzer and Ulku (2008) specify that an individual that 
acquires the nationality of the destination country might access to higher adaptability 
tools that can potentiate his value in the labor markets. So, the analysis of the 
nationality effect with respect to the Immigration Surplus also motivates the 
hypotheses expressed in this section. 
The following premises intend to prove, through the econometric analysis, the 
existence of a link between the immigration surplus and the integration of 
immigrants. (These entire hypotheses were formulated considering just the thirty 
seven selected countries and for the years of 2007 to 2012). 
1. Friendly immigration policies that promote integration of immigrants in host 
countries should have an impact in the national income though the expansion of 
the immigration surplus. 
2. Encouraging integration through long term residence permits might increase the 
openness and adaptation of immigrants to new surroundings. As a consequence, 
the promotion of access to social, economic and politic participation will enhance 
the immigration surplus. 
3. Deeper integration to labor markets should lead to higher levels of immigration 
surplus and thus to an enlargement of the IS. 
4. Migration policies that contribute on granting the nationality to immigrants may 
impact the immigration surplus in a certain way. The coefficient of this relation 
should be significant but with uncertain sign due to diverse effect that this event 
can potentiate in the host economy. 
Using these propositions, we should be able to express and measure the possible 
relation that exist between immigration surplus and integration of immigrants; then 
with the results of the analysis it will be possible to give further recommendations to 
migration policies in order to boost the economic growth. 
Now that the hypotheses have been described, we will proceed to define the variables 





3.2 Description of the variables 
 
In this section of the chapter will be described with detail the variables used in the 
research. It is important to remark that some of the parameters comprised in the 
database, especially the ones used in the IS, are the result of own computations made 
according to the economic theory and the research papers of Borjas (1994) and 
Strielkowski (2012).  
The countries used for the purposes of this research were selected according to the 
same thirty seven countries that the British Council and Migration Policy Group (MPG) 
used to measure the Migrant Integration Policy Index in their document (MIPEX, 




































 United Kingdom 
 United States* 
 
*Countries that join the MIPEX since 2010. Observations of integration index are just available 
for the period of 2010-2012. 
The time period defined for the research is limited in the same way because of the 
scarce number of publications of the MIPEX.  The Migrant Integration Policy Index has 
been published by the Migration Policy Group just three times; the publications 
correspond to the years 2004, 2007 and 2010. Unfortunately, the results of the MIPEX 
2004 are not comparable with the results obtained in 2007 and 2010. Consequently, 
the time period covered in this research will be limited from 2007 to 2012. 
Since the time observations of the MIPEX are very limited due to its recent creation, it 
is necessary to assume that countries will keep a constant level of immigrant 
integration in their parameters until the next index is published. Hence, the countries 




Similarly, after the second publication of the MIPEX, countries will depict the same 
level in the MIPEX indicators for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
The description of variables used in the model will be divided into three sections; each 
one according to the theoretical concept they are related: 
 Variables used to measure the Immigration Surplus. 
 Variables used to measure integration of immigrants. 
 Control variables. 
3.2.1 Data description 
 
The data comprised in this Master thesis corresponds to annual4 indicators published 
by international organizations, public institutions and statistical service agencies. 
Now we will list the organisms in charge of the collection of this information: 
 British Council. 
 Cekos IN. Economic and legal consulting agency. 
 European Commission. 
 Institute of Development Policy and Management, School of Environment and 
Development (University of Manchester). 
 Migration Policy Institute. 
 National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia. 
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. 
 The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. 
 The World Bank. 
The data collected by these institutions serves as indicators of demographic 
characteristics of the population, conditions of a labor markets, average salaries, 
migrations inflows and immigrant policy indicators. 
3.2.2 Variables used to measure the Immigration Surplus 
 
As it was described in the previous chapter, Equation 2.5 depicts the computation of 
the immigration surplus as a fraction of the national income in the following way: 
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 The Migrant Integration Policy Index is the only report from the data base that is published with a 




Equation 2.5 Immigration surplus as a fraction of national income 





     
 Labor’s share of national income (s). 
 Labor’s elasticity of factor price (e). 
 Fraction of the labor force that is foreign born or third-country national (m). 
Labor’s share of national income (s).  
The OECD explains the labor’s income share of the national income in the following 
way: 
“Unit labour costs measure the average cost of labour per unit of output. They are 
calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to real output, or equivalently, as the ratio of 
average labour costs per hour to labour productivity (output per hour). As such, a unit 
labour cost represents a link between productivity and the cost of labour in producing 
output”. (OECD Statistics, 2012) 
Appendix A contains the complete information available of the labor’s share of 
national income for the total economy. Most of this information was published by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in their complete 
databases available via OECD’s iLibrary5. The information expressed for countries that 
doesn’t belong to the OECD was obtained through research papers, public institutions 
and other agencies. 
Labor’s elasticity of factor price (e) 
The labor’s elasticity of factor price represents the percentage change in the wages as 
a consequence of a change of one percent in the size of the labor force. Thus, to 
measure this concept is necessary to execute the following equation for each selected 
country for its respective year: 
Equation 3.1 Computation of the elasticity of factor price 
  
                             
               
 
The variation in the total labor force and wages are measured from year to year. 
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Appendix B contains the information available about the total labor force for the 
selected countries from 2006 to 2012. The information about the total labor force in 
each country was gathered from The World Bank Database with the exception for 
Serbia; the total labor force information for this country was collected from the 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. Appendix C shows the results from the 
computations of the year to year change in the total labor force for the time period of 
2007 to 2012.  
Appendix D depicts the published average annual wages for the selected countries 
from 2006 to 2012. The information about the average annual wages for each country 
was gathered from the OECD, Eurostat, statistical service agencies from certain 
countries. Appendix E shows the results of the computations from the year to year 
change in the average annual wages for the time period of 2007 to 2012. 
Fraction of the labor force that is foreign born (m) 
This concept used by Borjas to calculate the Immigration Surplus represents the 
percentage of the labor force that is composed by third nationals or foreign born 
workers under a legal status. Since there is no precise information available 
specifically for the immigrant labor force, this project will used instead the 
international migrant stock provided by The World Bank Database. This institution 
defines the international migrant stock in the following way: 
“International migrant stock is the number of people born in a country other than that 
in which they live. It also includes refugees”. (The World Bank, 2008) In other words, 
this is the proportion of foreign born, third national or refugees living in a country 
relative to the total population in the same territory. 
Appendix F shows the International Migrant Stock for the selected countries. 
Immigration Surplus (IS) 
Now that the required information has been collected and it will apply the same 
methodology suggested by Borjas and Strielkowski, this investigation attempts to 
calculate the Immigration Surplus for the thirty-seven selected countries during the 
period 2007 to 2012. 
Appendix G illustrates the results of the computations of the Immigration Surplus for 
the thirty seven countries during the selected time period of 2007 to 2012. As it can 
be seen, several of the IS’s show as a result a negative percentage, this would mean 
that the entry of immigrants to the economies of the host countries possibly derived 
in a decrease in the national income, and thus, contradict the theory proposed by 




which the IS’s have been calculated, the global financial crisis of 2008 emerged; 
consequently diverse imbalances occurred in the financial and labor markets between 
other kind of negative shocks. This event can justify that the results of this research 
are not entirely consistent with the economic theory of Borjas since the possible 
effects of economic growth expected with the movement of immigrant labor forces to 
a foreign labor market in a host country was probably overshadowed by the 
unflattering economic outlook due to financial bubbles, large public deficits or high 
unemployment rates that this thirty seven countries experimented during these years. 
To express the amount of wealth that the Immigration Surpluses represent, Appendix 
H express the fraction of IS in current U.S. dollars for each year. These were calculated 
with the percentages of IS’s computed in Appendix G and then multiplied by the sizes 
of each respective economy measured in current U.S. dollars. 
Now that the variables related to the IS have been explained, we will continue with the 
description of the variables used by the Migrant Integration Policy Index. 
3.2.3 Variables used to measure the immigrant integration 
 
As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Migrant Integration Policy Index is a 
tool developed by British Council and the Migration Policy Group with the purpose of 
measuring the results of the integration policies in thirty seven countries; these 
measurements are helpful to evaluate, compare and improve the legal immigrant’s 
situation in host nations. 
The model proposed in this project will use the policy indicators of the MIPEX 
covering the seven policy areas; labor market mobility, family reunion, education, 
political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-
discrimination. Then, each of this seven policy indicators will be divided each into five 
sub-policy indicators (thirty five policy indicators in total). The following chart 




Chart 3.1MIPEX segmentation by policy area
 
Source: Migrant Integration Policy Index, British Council and Migration Policy Group. 
Available at www.mipex.eu 
Now we will proceed to give a brief description of each of the policy indicators above 
mentioned. 
 Labor market mobility:  measures the level of integration that an immigrant may 
experience in the labor market of the host country. 
 Access to labor markets: measures the access that immigrants have towards 
employment, whether in the private or public sector or as self-employed. 
MIPEX 
Labor market mobility: 
- Labor market mobility. 
- Access to labor markets. 
- Access to general support. 
- Targeted support. 
- Worker's rights. 
 
Family reunion: 
- Family reunion. 
- Eligibility. 
- Acq. Conditions. 
- Security of status. 
- Rights associated. 
Education: 
- Education 
- Access to education. 
- Targeting needs. 
- New Opportunities. 
- Intercultural education. 
Political participation: 
- Political participation. 
- Electoral rights. 
- Political liberties. 
- Consultative bodies. 
- Implementation policies. 
Long term residence: 
- Long term residence. 
- Eligibility. 
- Acq. Conditions 
- Security of status. 
- Associated rights. 
Nationality: 
- Access to nationality. 
- Eligibility. 
- Acq. Conditions. 
- Security of status. 
- Dual nationality. 
Discrimination: 
- Anti-discrimination. 
- Definition & concepts. 
- Fields of application. 
- Enforcement mechanisms. 




 Access to general support: measures the level of access of immigrants to public 
employment services, educational or vocational trainings. 
 Targeted support: measures the level of facilitation and recognition of skills, 
professional and/or academic qualifications obtained outside the host country. 
 Worker’s rights: measures the access and integration of immigrant to a trade 
union. This indicator also evaluates the equal access to social security, equal 
working conditions and active policy information on rights of migrant workers. 
 
 Family reunion: evaluates the feasibility that first-degree relatives of immigrant 
can live legally in the host country. 
 Eligibility: measures the feasibility that dependent relatives in the ascending line 
or dependent adult children of the immigrant can live legally in the host country. 
 Acquisition conditions of family reunion: measures the level of integration the 
family of the immigrant can experience with respect to of requirements (language, 
social, cultural, etc…) that the host economy request to permit the family reunion. 
 Security of status: evaluates the duration validity of the permit granted to the 
family, the feasibility to reject or refuse the renovation of the permit and the legal 
guarantees of the family members. 
 Rights associated with family reunion: evaluates the rights to autonomous 
residence permit for partners and children reaching the age of majority and the 
right to autonomous residence in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death or 
physical or emotional violence. Also measures the access to education and training 
for adult family members. 
 
 Education: measures the level of integration that an immigrant may experience in 
the education system of the host country. 
 Access to education: evaluates the access to pre-primary, primary, secondary and 
higher education of an immigrant in a host country. 
 Targeting needs: evaluates the access to language, training or vocational training 
that immigrants have in the host country. 
 New opportunities: evaluates the provision option of learning the language and 
culture of immigrant pupil’s to promote their integration. 
 Intercultural education: evaluates the appreciation of the intercultural education 
and diversity. This indicator also grades the state of support of public information 
initiatives to promote cultural diversity. 
 
 Political participation: evaluates the feasibility that immigrants can access to 




 Electoral rights: grades the access of immigrants to vote in national, regional and 
local elections, as well as the right to stand for an election in a local level. 
 Political liberties: evaluates the access of immigrant to join a political party, 
association or to create media (newspapers, radio, television, etc.). 
 Consultative bodies: evaluates the access of immigrants to structural 
consultation and composition of national, regional and local consultative bodies. 
 Implementation policies: measures the level of active policy of information by 
national, regional and local level. Also evaluates the public funding or support of 
immigrants’ organizations at national, regional and local level. 
 
 Access to nationality: evaluates the access of immigrants to get the nationality of 
the host country. 
 Eligibility: grades the feasibility that dependent relatives, first, second and third 
generations as well as spouses can access the nationality of host country. 
 Acquisition conditions of nationality: Evaluates the language, cultural and legal 
requirements and costs that immigrants face to acquire the nationality condition. 
 Security of status: evaluates the grounds for refusing the status of nationality, the 
discretionary powers in refusal and the legal guarantees and redress in case of 
refusal. 
 Dual nationality: evaluates the condition or requirement to renounce / lose 
foreign nationality upon naturalization for first generation. Also de dual 
nationality for second or third generation. 
 
 Anti-Discrimination: evaluates the immigrants’ anti-discrimination policies and 
campaigns in the host country. 
 Definitions and concepts: evaluates the definition and concepts of immigrant 
discrimination depicted in the legal framework of a host country. 
 Fields of application: evaluates the application of anti-discrimination policies in 
the employment, education, social security and public services fields. 
 Enforcement mechanisms: grades the access of victims of discrimination acts to 
judicial civil procedures, criminal procedures and administrative procedures. Also 
evaluates the protection against victimization in employment, vocational training, 
education, services, and goods. 
 Equality policies: evaluates the application of equality policies by the specialized 
agencies in the host countries through legal and informative activities. 
The informative levels of all these policy indicators will be gathered from the reports 
of the MIPEX of 2007 and 2010. The MIPEX of 2007 measures these policy indicators 
for twenty nine countries; meanwhile, in the 2010 version other nine extra countries 




countries will keep a constant level of immigrant integration in their parameters until 
the next index is published. Hence, the countries will depict the same level in the 
MIPEX indicators for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. After the second publication of 
the MIPEX, countries will depict the same level in the MIPEX indicators for the years 
2010, 2011 and 2012. 
Appendix from I to V comprise the levels of integration for every policy indicator 
divided by country and period of time. The levels of integration of immigrants for the 
policy indicator of education are not available for the year 2007, thus, when entering 
this information to the econometric model will be considered as a null observation. 
For any further explanation about the computation of the levels in each policy 
indicator, the reader can consult the second chapter of this research or directly in the 
website of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (www.mipex.eu). 
3.2.4 Control variables 
 
The level of the national income is prone to changes according to diverse economic, 
political, social factors, etc. Thus, this research finds appropriate to include control 
variables that may represent the performance of the national economy and 
consequently complement the information for the econometric analysis. This implies 
that the increase or decrease in the level of the immigration surplus is exposed to the 
same factors that can produce variations in this indicator. As mentioned in previous 
section, the research faces the issue of measuring the IS during a financial crisis stage, 
thus, with the next control variables should be able to illustrate and absorb part of 
these economic shocks. 
The variables selected to represent these shocks on the economies of the countries are 
the following: 
 Gross Domestic Product growth rate. 
 Unemployment rate. 
 Remittances outflows. 
 Remittances inflows. 
The variables of GDP growth rate and unemployment rate were chosen under the 
assumption that they can describe the economic performance of a country and the 
conditions of their labor market in a general aspect. 
The inflow and outflow of remittances are considered as control variables under the 




sent to their native countries or the amount of wealth that nationals receive from 
immigrants working abroad; remittances are one of the few available indicators that 
can characterize the performance of immigrant workers in the host countries. 
All of these variables had been collected from The World Bank Database. 
Once it has been defined the variables that will be used in the preliminary base 
econometric model of this project, it should be also described the statistical and 
econometric methods employed to measure the relationship between the immigration 
surplus and policy indicators of migrant integration. 
3.3 Bayesian Model Averaging 
 
The project faced a peculiar dilemma when selecting the appropriate and relevant 
independent variables for the econometric model. Without a specific guidance from 
economic theory, the integration of immigrants into a host society can have a wide 
range of explanatory variables and indicators that can impact this phenomenon. 
Consequently, the definition of an econometric model given the uncertainty resulting 
from the large number of independent variables is complicated causing that the 
results obtained may be not effective and/or inconsistent. 
It is important to denote that this paper will follow the same methodology used by 
Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001) “Model uncertainty in cross-country growth 
regressions”. Also, as a theoretical support, were used the documents of Eicher, 
Papageorgiou and Raftery (2011) “Default priors and predictive performance in 
Bayesian Model Averaging, within application to growth determinants” and Horvath 
(2011) “Research & development and long-term economic growth: A Bayesian model 
averaging analysis”. 
As mentioned in Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001), “A Bayesian framework allows us to 
deal with both model and parameter uncertainty in a straightforward and formal way” 
(Fernandez - Ley - Steel, 2001). Since the MIPEX uses thirty five indicators to 
represent integration plus the four control variables included, it should be considered 
the existence of an extremely large set of possible models with subsets up to thirty 
nine regressors to include in the model. 
To apply the Bayesian Model Averaging, it must be assumed that certain variables 
expressing immigrant’s integration could be more important in explaining the 
increase or decrease of the immigration surplus. Thus, we won’t select a specific 
subset of regressors according to the economic theory; instead of that, the Bayesian 




the models by using the precise posterior inclusion model probabilities as weights. 
(Fernandez - Ley - Steel, 2001).  
It will be considered linear regression models where the IS for n countries, grouped in 
a vector y, is regressed on a α intercept and a number of explanatory variables chosen 
from a set of k variables in a matrix Z of dimensions     . Therefore, it will be 
assumed a rank           , where    is an n dimensional vector of 1’s and define 
β as the full k-dimensional vector of regression coefficients. Following the same 
computation (Fernandez, Ley and Steel, 2001), and allowing for any subset of the 
variables included in Z to be incorporated in the model, the (      possible 
combinations of subsets of regressors that can be generated result in more than five 
hundred billions of different models (                    .   denotes the model 
with specific group of regressors in   . All this, leads to the following expression 
(Fernandez - Ley - Steel, 2001). 
Equation 3.2 Model IS with integration of immigrants under uncertainty conditions 
               
Where       
               represents the groups of relevant regression 
coefficients included and       is a parameter of scale for the residuals. Each of the 
possible models excludes variables by assigning the value of zero to the 
corresponding β. It must be also assumed that ε is an n-dimensional normal 
distribution with zero mean and an identity covariance matrix. 
According to FLS (2001), to structure a Bayesian framework is necessary to fulfill a 
sampling model with the prior distributions for the parameters in   , α,    and σ. 
Since we are modeling the IS under uncertainty conditions it must be recognized the 
selection of the distribution can have significant impact in the posterior model 
probabilities (Fernandez, Ley and Steel, 2001).  
The idea to propose prior probabilities for this project results useless due to the 
inexistent information available about the relation between integration and the 
immigration surplus. Thus, Fernandez, Ley and Steel recommend to use improper non 
informative priors for the parameters that are common for all models in the cases 
where incorporating substantive prior information into the analysis results either 
impossible or provide irrelevant information. The priors proposed (FLS, 2001) for α 
and σ and the g-prior structure for    correspond to the product of: 
Equation 3.3 Priors for parameters α and σ (Fernandez - Ley - Steel, 2011) 




Assume also a common prior for σ across the different models, invariably conditioning 
on the full set of regressors. 
Equation 3.4 g prior- structure for   (Fernandez - Ley - Steel, 2011) 
 (  |      )    
         
         
    
   
        - Density function of a q-dimensional Normal distribution on w with 
mean m and covariance matrix V. 
Since the possibilities for the g-structure are very diverse, FLS (2011) conclude that 
the following structure leads to a reasonable result: 
Equation 3.5 Optimal g-structure (Fernandez - Ley - Steel, 2011) 
   
 
          
 
For the components of   that does not appear in  will be considered as ceros. 
The sampling and prior for the selection of the regressors for the model   has been 
already described. Now is proper to also detail a prior distribution for the space of M 
for all the    resulting models. This prior distribution for the space of M suggested in 
FLS (2001) has the following structure: 
 Equation 3.6 Prior distribution over the space of M for all the possible models 
 (  )             
                         ∑    
  
   
  
To suggest a prior probability of ½ for including a regressor is necessary to assume 
    
  , this will result in a uniform distribution on the model space. 
Now the Bayesian will be able to model the uncertainty factor assuming that the 
posterior distribution of any quantity (Δ) is the average of the posterior distributions 
of that quantity under each of the models with weights given by the posterior model 







Equation 3.7 Posterior model probabilities 
     ∑             
  
   
 
If the selection of Δ is appropriate, equation 3.6 provide the posterior distribution of 
the parameters such as the regression coefficients and makes possible to forecast 
future. The marginal posterior probability will be computed with the sum of the 
posterior probabilities of all models that contain the regressor. FLS (2001) 
     that is regularly of standard form, is computed in the following way: 
Equation 3.8 Computation of     
 (  | )  
        
∑         
  
   
 
        marginal likelihood of the model   obtained in the following way: 
Equation 3.9 Computation of    (  ) 
       ∫ ( |         )         (  |      )        
Using the previous equations can be measured the posterior inclusion probabilities 
(PIP) and model the uncertainty to choose the appropriate subset of parameters that 
can express the relation between the integration of migrants and immigration surplus 
without a theoretical framework that can be used as a guide6. 
Since k=39, the analytical computation of each PIP with the previous equations 
represents a very exhaustive process. Instead of it, we will execute the computation of 
the posterior inclusion probabilities using the statistical software R Studio and the 
code suggested by T. Havranek, R. Horvath, Z. Irsova and M. Rusnak in “Cross-country 
heterogeneity in intertemporal substitution” (2013). 
Now that the Bayesian Model Averaging method employed in the research has been 
explained, this paper will continue to describe the econometric model that will be 
used to measure the relation between our dependent and relevant independent 
variables. 
                                                          
6
 For more information about the construction of the BMA posterior inclusion probabilities please 
consult Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001), Eicher (2011) and Horvath (2011). These present a very clear 




3.1 Empirical model 
 
In this section will be defined the structure of the preliminary base econometric 
model assumed to measure the relation between variables. 
This project will use the ordinary least squares (OLS) model to establish the links 
between the variables: immigration surplus, migrant integration policy indicators and 
the economic control variables within groups and between groups of migrants in the 
thirty seven countries. Additionally, the data will be tested to detect issues of outliers, 
heteroscedasticity and multicollienarity. In case of the presence of these issues, the 
econometric adjustment methods will be executed.  
The preliminary base model has the following structure: 
Equation 3.9 Empirical model. The relation between the immigration surplus, the 
integration of immigrants and the economic control variables 
                        
Where       is the intercept of each model and    denotes the model with specific 
group of regressors. Is important to remember that    represents the groups of 
relevant regression coefficients included. Finally,       represent the residuals of each 
specific model. 
The preliminary model can be expressed in the following alternative way. Each of the 
possible models excludes non relevant variables by assigning the value of zero to the 
corresponding β. 
Equation 3.10 Extended version of empirical model. The relation between the 
immigration surplus, the integration of immigrants and the economic control variables 
                                                                  
                                                    
                                                        
                                                     
                                                 
                                                 





- Immigration surplus = IS 
- Labor market mobility = LMM 
- Access to labor markets = ALM 
- Access to general support = AGS 
- Targeted support = TS 
- Worker's rights = WR 
- Family reunion = FR 
- Eligibility family reunion = EFR 
- Acq. Conditions family reunion = CFR 
- Security status family reunion = SFR 
- Rights associated family r. =RFR 
- Education = ED 
- Access to education = AE 
- Targeting needs = TN 
- New Opportunities = NO 
- Intercultural education = IE 
- Political participation = PP 
- Electoral rights = ER 
- Political liberties = PL 
- Consultative bodies = CB 
- Implementation policies = IP 
- Long term residence = LTR 
- Eligibility long term residence = ELR 
- Acq. Conditions long term res. = ALR 
- Security of status long term res. = SLR 
- Associated rights long term res. = RLR  
- Access to nationality = AN 
- Eligibility nationality = EN 
- Acq. Conditions nationality = ACN 
- Security of status nationality = SN 
- Dual nationality = DN 
- Anti-discrimination = AD 
- Definitions & concepts = DC 
- Fields of application = FA 
- Enforcement mechanisms = EM 
- Equality policies = EP 
- GDP growth rate = GDP 
- Unemployment rate = UR 
- Remittance outflow = RO 
- Remittance inflow = RI 
 
- Country of observation = c 




It is important to remember that before the ordinary least squares model is computed, 
the preliminary base structure will be processed through the Bayesian Model 
Averaging mechanism that will provide the PIP of each independent variable; this will 
represent the probability that given regressor is included in the “correct model” and 
that has an impact on the dependent variable. Once the relevant variables have been 
identified through BMA, we will proceed to model the OLS with the immigration 
surplus as dependent variable and the relevant regressors as independent variables. 
In the next chapter we will present the posterior results of the BMA, the OLS model 
and the tests to detect issues of outliers, heteroscedasticity and multicollienarity. 
Then it will be include the interpretation of the coefficients. The results should bring 
enough information to the give concrete recommendations to migration policy makers 





















4. Results and discussion. 
 
A common concern about planning and structuring migration policies lays in the 
discussion whether the migrants are beneficial for the economic growth of a nation, or 
whether these individuals come into a country without any contribution to society 
and may only take advantage of the conditions of the labor market. Also, the 
implementation of same policies may have diverse results in different countries. 
In the pursuit of understanding the economic contributions of these immigrant 
groups, Oxford Economics and the Department of Employment and Learning (2009) 
define the following economics benefits and disadvantages of migration when they 
analyzed the phenomenon in Northern Ireland during the period of 2004 to 2009: 
Benefits: 
 Immigrant workers help to fill the job vacancies and skill gaps. 
 Labor migration presents a possible solution to countries that experience aging 
problems in its labor market. 
 Migrant workers become contributors to pensions and fill the gaps of an 
increasing retired population. 
 Innovation. 
 Migrant workers have been important for company survival because these 
workers are able to accept lower wages so companies should not be relocated. 
Disadvantages: 
 Raise unemployment rates. 
 Labor immigration causes a decrease in wages in the short run. 
 Increase in population. 
 Due to the increase in the population, there is also an increase in the cost of the 
public services and the public expenditures.  
Added to these findings, Tolstokorova (2009) discusses the paradox of whether to 
promote or not labor immigration. This paradox explains that the main incentive for 
migrants is unemployment and poverty in their native countries, hence, people should 
move to more attractive labor markets in order to secure the proper means of survival 
of their family at home. So, if migration is considered as a positive phenomenon, 




As it can be seen, the resolution about the phenomenon of labor migration, and 
therefore the integration of immigrants, is still inconsistent. The literature presents 
different conclusions depending on the country and the time period. As a 
consequence, it has been triggered a huge controversy about the effects of immigrant 
workers in the economic performance of a country and how policy makers should 
approach to this topic. 
This chapter will evaluate the effects of migrant integration policies in the thirty seven 
selected countries with respect to their observed immigration surplus during the time 
period of 2007 to 2012. First, we will present the posterior inclusion probabilities 
resulted from the Bayesian Model Averaging. Once the relevant independent variables 
have been identified with the BMA, we will proceed to execute tests to the database in 
order to determine if it presents problems such as outliers, heteroscedasticity and/or 
multicollinearity. After the tests, the final version of the Ordinary Least Squares model 
(OLS) will be implemented to measure the relation between the immigration surplus 
and the integration policies so we can determine if the integration of foreign labor 
force to these thirty seven countries had a  positive effect in the economic growth or 
not. 
4.1 Results of the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
 
In this section will be presented the results obtained using the Bayesian Model 
Averaging. The data base introduced to this method includes as dependent variables 
one hundred and ninety five observations of the immigration surplus from thirty 
seven countries from 2007 to 2010. Similarly, the database contains thirty nine 
independent variables including the thirty five migrant integration policy indicators 
and the other four control variables for the same period of time; this represents a total 
of seven thousand six hundred five observations. 
Table 4.1 presents the results obtained from the BMA using the statistical software R 
Studio and the code suggested by T. Havranek, R. Horvath, Z. Irsova and M. Rusnak in 
“Cross-country heterogeneity in intertemporal substitution” (2013). 










Security status long residence 0.734752390 1.32E-04 9.68E-05 1.0000000 
Access to nationality 0.710572231 -1.74E-04 1.52E-04 0.0000000 
Access to labor markets 0.677688159 7.76E-05 6.44E-05 1.0000000 
Associated rights long term 
residence 




Rights associated to family 
reunion 
0.219043634 -2.66E-05 5.62E-05 0.0000000 
Dual nationality 0.195029570 1.62E-05 4.78E-05 0.8250191 
Political liberties 0.153468881 -1.43E-05 3.73E-05 0.0000000 
Acquisition conditions to 
nationality 
0.111884051 -1.20E-05 3.84E-05 0.0059706 
Fields of application of anti-
discrimination 
0.103793754 4.58E-06 1.53E-05 1.0000000 
Eligibility of nationality 0.083641801 -6.88E-06 2.62E-05 0.0293628 
Worker's rights 0.076404275 -7.70E-06 3.06E-05 0.0189778 
Family reunion 0.074709420 -1.37E-05 5.68E-05 0.0201406 
Long term residence 0.063871477 -1.24E-05 5.53E-05 0.0189900 
Labor market mobility 0.053366916 -5.02E-06 4.58E-05 0.3101025 
Anti-discrimination 0.046763906 3.26E-06 1.79E-05 0.9865038 
Eligibility of family reunion 0.045631852 -3.64E-06 2.03E-05 0.0121464 
Security status of nationality 0.041717252 -3.33E-06 2.18E-05 0.1582419 
Education 0.037373882 -3.52E-06 2.19E-05 0.0025667 
Acquisition conditions family 
reunion 
0.033263373 3.32E-06 2.29E-05 0.9535227 
New opportunities of education 0.028707349 -1.57E-06 1.15E-05 0.0032982 
Unemployment rate 0.026052685 4.88E-04 3.80E-03 1.0000000 
Remittances inflow 0.025162189 6.33E-15 5.12E-14 0.9770957 
Targeted support to labor market 0.024840679 1.17E-06 1.02E-05 0.8472845 
Access to general support 0.023067942 -1.04E-06 1.08E-05 0.1673260 
Consultative bodies 0.021580604 -8.48E-07 7.67E-06 0.0056016 
Enforcement mechanisms 0.021357592 1.26E-06 1.16E-05 0.9624094 
Electoral rights 0.019530431 5.99E-07 6.13E-06 1.0000000 
Remittance outflow 0.017517412 -1.37E-15 1.61E-14 0.1553779 
Security status of family reunion 0.016965943 -7.69E-07 9.04E-06 0.0738221 
Political participation 0.016951043 -9.48E-07 1.27E-05 0.1967293 
Targeting needs 0.015570279 -4.84E-07 5.78E-06 0.0080958 
Implementation policies 0.014041704 -1.23E-07 4.75E-06 0.4915226 
Access to education 0.013852036 -4.26E-07 6.31E-06 0.0760766 
Acquisition conditions of long 
term residence 
0.013275000 -3.54E-07 5.48E-06 0.0294262 
Equality policies 0.012375603 2.08E-07 4.98E-06 0.8525256 
Eligibility of long term residence 0.012200500 -3.29E-07 5.16E-06 0.0291168 
Definitions & concepts 0.011428199 2.57E-07 5.49E-06 0.8689852 
Intercultural education 0.010839769 -1.48E-07 5.34E-06 0.4785560 
GDP growth rate 0.008564292 -6.22E-05 2.60E-03 0.1856141 
Source: Own computations  
The posterior inclusion probabilities presented in the previous table express the 
probability that given regressor is included in the “correct model” and that has an 




the analysis, we will just consider as “relevant” to those independent variables whit a 
PIP higher than 50 percent. We can observe that only the independent variables 
“Security Status of Long Residence”, “Access to Labor Markets” and “Access to 
Nationality” have a PIP above the established parameter and that probably these 
should be the ones included in the model. 
Once we have obtained the posterior inclusion probabilities and identified the 
relevant variables that can measure the relation between the Immigration Surplus and 
the integration of immigrants, we can infer that the base model of our project will 
have the following structure: 
Equation 4.1 Empirical model. The relation between the immigration surplus and the 
migrant policy indicators 
                                                
 Immigration surplus = IS 
 Access to labor markets = ALM 
 Security of status long term residence = SLR 
 Access to nationality = AN 
 Residuals =   
Following the previous model, regression 4.1 depicts the estimated coefficients to 
describe the relation between the immigration surplus and the independent variables. 
According to this first model, the integration of immigrants through the “Security 
Status of Long Residence” and the “Access to Labor Markets” had a positive impact in 
the Immigration Surplus of the selected countries during 2007 to 2012. Meanwhile, 
the integration of immigrants through the “Access to Nationality” had a negative 











Regression 4.1  
Model: 
IS = SLR + ALM + AN +      
Residuals: 
      Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
  -0.075858 -0.001048 0.000802 0.003062 0.029817 
  _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Coefficients: 
      
 
Estimate Standard error T - value Pr (>|t|) 
  (Intercept) -5.39e-03 2.31e-03 -2.328 0.020962 * 
 SLR  1.08e-04 4.12e-05  2.613 0.009696 ** 
 ALM  6.01e-05 2.45e-05  2.450 0.015190 * 
 AN -1.43e-04 3.76e-05 -3.804 0.000192 *** 
 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Significance codes: 0   ‘***’ 0.001   ‘**’ 0.01   ‘*’ 0.05   ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Residual standard error: 0.008945 on 191 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.09516,   Adjusted R-squared:  0.08095  
F-statistic: 6.696 on 3 and 191 DF,  p-value: 0.0002547 
 
Now we will proceed to execute tests to the database in order to determine if it 
presents problems such as outliers, heteroscedasticity and/or multicollinearity. 
4.2 Detecting influential observations 
 
In this section we will execute the tests to identify possible influential observations or 
outliers in our data base. 
Douglas Hawkins affirms that an outlier is considered an observation in a data base 
which can deviate so much from the other observations and may arouse suspicions 
that it was the result of a different mechanism or event (Hawkins, 1980). 
The dependent variable’s value of these outlier observations can be identified as 
unusual because of its residual and leverage. An observation with large residual may 
indicate a data entry error or other problem. The leverage measures how far an 
independent variable deviates from the mean; this can also indicate a possible error. It 
is important to identify the outliers because residuals and leverage can substantially 
influence and change the estimated coefficients of our regression; removing these 





Plotting the residuals of the observations is possible to notice if the data base contains 
possible outliers. Figure 4.1 depicts the residuals of the first model. 
Figure 4.1 Fitted values of empirical model and the residuals. 
 
It is possible to observe that certain observations present large residuals. In this case, 
observations number 25, 110 and 111 can certainly represent data entry error or 
other problem that can influence the estimated coefficients in the first model. 
(Appendix W details the correspondent number of observation assigned to each 
country during a specific year). 
To measure the influence of these or other possible observations, we can proceed to 
use the Cook’s Distance, and thus identify the outliers (O’Halloran, 2005). “Cook's 
distance measures the effect of deleting a given observation” (Cook, 1977). 
Equation 4.2 Cook’s Distance for identifying influential observations 
   ∑
  ̂       ̂  
 
  ̂ 
 
   
 
   ̂     = Estimated mean of y at observation j in a model which observation i has 
been omitted. 
  ̂  = Estimated mean from the full regression model for the observation j. 
   = Number of regression coefficients. 




For more information about the computation of Cook’s distance or the process to 
identify the influential observations, please consult “Model Checking” (2005) by 
Sharyn O’Halloran; there is a detailed explanation about the topic. The statistical 
software R Studio was used to calculate the Cook’s distance for each observation and 
then identify the influential observations. Table 4.2 comprises the influential 
observation contained and that should be removed from the data base. 
Table 4.2 Influential observations 
Country Year IS ALM SLR AN d1 r 
Canada 2007 -0.01042265 90 50 74 0.04685984 -2.730374 
Canada 2008 -0.01735571 90 50 74 0.16314710 -5.094614 
Canada 2010 -0.04844829 90 50 74 0.14562250 -4.897337 
Canada 2011 -0.01120869 90 50 74 0.05651216 -2.998421 
Ireland 2010 0.00957786 40 29 58 0.03063823  2.011176 
Latvia 2010 -0.03296203 30 29 15 0.06722382 -3.432660 
Latvia 2011 0.01470800 30 29 15 0.02185124  1.957074 
Luxembourg 2008 -0.04485016 20 36 34 0.09212326 -4.477297 
Luxembourg 2009 -0.08102210 20 36 34 0.33658589 -8.558136 
Luxembourg 2011 -0.03488760 20 36 74 0.10368986 -2.756167 
Luxembourg 2012 -0.03804210 20 36 74 0.13272955 -3.118324 
Switzerland 2007 0.02903360 60 57 36 0.02943199 -2.708015 
 
It is proper to rerun the model, but now without the influential observations. 
Regression 4.2 expresses the estimated coefficients of it. 
The model shows that the estimated coefficients “ALM” and “AN” are still significant 
but “SLR” now is not. The “Access to Labor Markets” still presents a positive impact in 
the Immigration Surplus. Similarly and the integration policy indicator of “Access to 











Regression 4.2  
Model: 
IS = SLR + ALM + AN +      
Residuals: 
      Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
  -0.0146468 -0.0004718 0.0003167 0.0013683 0.0099498 
  _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Coefficients: 
      
 
Estimate Standard error T - value Pr (>|t|) 
  (Intercept) -6.283e-04 7.043e-04 -0.892 0.3735 
  SLR  1.605e-05 1.253e-05  1.281 0.2017 
  ALM  1.892e-05 7.370e-06  2.567 0.0111 * 
 AN -5.366e-05 1.176e-05 -4.561 9.42e-06 *** 
 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Significance 
codes: 0   ‘***’ 0.001   ‘**’ 0.01   ‘*’ 0.05   ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Residual standard error: 0.002598 on 179 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.1111,   Adjusted R-squared:  0.09623 
F-statistic: 7.459 on 3 and 179 DF,  p-value: 9.825e-05 
 
Once the influential observations have been deleted, we will proceed to execute the 
test to determine the presence of multicollinearity. 
4.3 Detecting multicollinearity 
 
“Multicollinearity can be viewed as an interdependency condition that can exist quite 
apart from the nature or the even existence of, dependence between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable” (Farrar, Donald and Robert, 1967). In other 
words, represents a statistic issue where the correlations between the independent 
variable are strong and may influence the estimated coefficients. 
First, we will express the correlation matrix of our dependent and independent 
variables to analyze the possible existence of multicollinearity. Table 4.3 shows the 







Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix 
Regressor IS ALM AN 
IS 1 0.0798241 -0.2561220 
ALM 0.07982410 1 0.38496990 
AN -0.25612200 0.3849699 1 
 
The correlation matrix didn't show a problematic level of correlation between the 
independent variables, thus, we can infer that the data doesn't have multicollinearity 
issues. 
To ensure the null existence of multicollinearity, it will be executed a second test using 
the Variance Inflation Factor. 
According to Thompson (2005), there is no definition of “high” Variance Inflation 
Factor that can indicate precisely the existence of multicollinearity, but values in the 
range of 5 to 10 are commonly used to express the presence of this issue. 
The hypotheses used to test the presence of multicollinearity are the following: 
Equation 4.3 Hypotheses to test the presence of multicollinearity using VIF 
  ::        
  ::        
Equation 4.4 Variance Inflation Factor 
     
 
     
  
R Studio was used again to calculate the Variance Inflation Factor for each observation 
and then make a new test to detect multicollinearity. Table 4.4 expresses the result of 
these computations. 





Thus, with the VIF values presented in Table 4.4, we can’t reject our null hypothesis 




Once the correlation matrix and the VIF test had been executed, we can proceed to 
analyze the possible existence of heteroscedasticity. 
4.4 Detecting heteroscedasticity 
 
Greene defines heteroscedasticity as: “Regression disturbances whose variances are not 
constant across observations” (Greene, 2002). 
In the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data, the statistical tests of significance can 
be invalidated because the errors of the model are correlated and not normally 
distributed. As a consequence, our estimators don’t have the lowest possible variance 
so they can’t be considered as Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (Greene, 2002). 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the behavior of the errors compared with the observed 
Immigration Surpluses and the fitted values of the model respectively. Is hard to 
determine just with the graphical representations of the residuals if the data involves 
heteroscedastic disturbances; this is because the project deals with a short number of 
observations due to the limited publications of the Migration Policy Index. 








Figure 4.3 Fitted values of empirical model and the residuals 
 
In order to determine the presence of heteroscedasticity in our data will be executed 
the White’s General Test suggested in Greene (2002). H. White formulated a test based 
on the following observations: 
 The correct covariance matrix for the least squares estimator is: 
   [   ]     [   ]  [     ][   ]   
 Where the conventional estimator for the variance is: 
       [   ]   
 Without the presence of heteroscedasticity “V” will give the following consistent 
estimator: 
   [   ] 
The hypotheses used to test the presence of heteroscedasticity are the next ones: 
Equation 4.5 Hypotheses to determine the presence of heteroscedasticity (White’s test) 
  :         for all i 
  :: Not    





Table 4.5 White’s test for constant variance 
White’s test for constant variance 
Data: 
White = 24.04 df = 0.38496990 p-value = 0.0002167 
 
Thus, with the p-value of 0.0002167 < 0.05 presented in Table 4.5, we reject our null 
hypothesis and then infer that the data base presents heteroscedasticity problems and 
that our standard errors may be biased and can lead to biased inferences. 
To confirm the result of the White’s test, it will be implemented a Breusch Pagan test 
to evaluate if the errors are dependent on the values of the independent variables 
(Greene, 2002). 
Equation 4.6 Hypotheses to determine heteroscedasticity (Breusch Pagan’s) 
  : Errors are independent to the values of independent variables 
  : Errors are not independent to the values of independent variables 
 
Table 4.6 Breusch Pagan test for independent errors 
Breusch Pagan test for independent errors. 
Data: 
BP = 9.7612 p-value = 0.007592 
 
Breusch Pagan’s test gives a p-value of 0.007592 < 0.05, thus, it will reject the null 
hypothesis and then infer that the errors in the model are not independent to the 
values of the independent variables. 
Since the data seems to be heteroscedastic because of the result of the White’s and 
Breusch Pagan’s tests, is necessary to proceed with the adjustments to fix this issue. 
4.5 Fixing heteroscedasticity 
 
Under the presence of heteroscedasticity, the Ordinary Least Squares model used to 
express the relation between the Immigration Surplus and the integration of 




To fix this issue, it can be used the White Heteroscedastic Consistent standard errors 
commonly known as “Robust Standard Errors”. White affirmed that heteroscedasticity 
can be fixed in the OLS by fixing the estimated standard errors (Murray, 2005). 
The Ordinary Least Squares assuming homoscedasticity derive the formula of the 
estimated standard errors in the following way: 
Equation 4.7 Estimated standard errors using OLS 
                         (  ̂)  √
∑  
 
     ∑  
  
In the case that it can’t be assumed data is homoscedastic, White Heteroscedastic 
Consistent standard errors computed the estimated standard errors in the following 
way: 
Equation 4.8 White’s estimated standard errors 
                                 (  ̂)  √
∑  
   
 
 ∑  
  
  
Regression 4.3 depicts the estimated coefficients of the model now using White’s 
Heteroscedastic Consistent standard errors.  
The Robust Standard Errors model shows that “ALM” and “AN” are significant. “Access 
to Labor Markets” shows a positive relation with respect to the Immigration Surplus; 
meanwhile, “Access to Nationality” has a negative impact in the Immigration Surplus. 
As it can be noticed the coefficients remain invariant with respect to the Ordinary 
Least Squares model but the adjustment to fix the heteroscedasticity has been made 
through the standard errors of the model. Now the coefficients should be unbiased 
and efficient. 
Another way to fix the issue of heteroscedasticity and to confirm the efficiency of our 
model using White’s approach is through a Generalized Least Squares Model (GLS). 
Regression 4.4 confirms the results from our previous model. For more information 
about the use of GLS, please consult “Econometrics. A Modern Introduction” by 









IS = ALM + AN +      
Residuals: 
      Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
  -0.0150909 0.0003629 0.0003953 0.0012065 0.0097230 
  _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Coefficients: 
      
 Estimate 
Robust 
standard error T - value Pr (>|t|) 
  (Intercept) -6.463e-05 5.509e-04 -0.117 0.90674 
  ALM  2.007e-05 7.328e-06  2.739 0.00679 ** 
 AN -4.778e-05 1.085e-05 -4.403 1.83e-05 *** 
 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Significance codes: 0   ‘***’ 0.001   ‘**’ 0.01   ‘*’ 0.05   ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Residual standard error: 0.002602 on 180 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.103,   Adjusted R-squared:  0.09301 
F-statistic: 10.33on 3 and 180 DF,  p-value: 5.656e-05 
 
Regression 4.4 
Generalized least squares fit by REML model: 
IS = ALM + AN +      
       AIC                 BIC               log Lik 
  -1595.59      -1582.818      801.795 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Coefficients: 
      
 
Estimate Standard error T - value Pr (>|t|) 
  (Intercept) -6.463e-05 5.509e-04 -0.117 0.90674 
  ALM  2.007e-05 7.328e-06  2.739 0.00679  
 AN -4.778e-05 1.085e-05 -4.403 1.83e-05  
 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Standardized residuals: 
                Min                            1Q                     Median                   3Q                 MAX 
          5.7989432              -0.1394574        0.1519148          0.4636013   3.7362554 
Residual standard error: 0.00260235 





Once the issue of heteroscedasticity has been fixed and the coefficients have been 
estimated as unbiased and efficient, the project will proceed with the interpretation of 
the results and then the conclusions. 
With this information and our results we can’t reject our first hypothesis. So, friendly 
immigration policies that promote integration of immigrants in host countries should 
have an impact in the national income though the expansion of the immigration 
surplus. Nevertheless, the impact of these friendly immigration policies can vary 
because due to the sensibility to economic shocks or business cycles. 
The empirical model implemented in this project depicted that the “Security Status of 
Long Term Residence” was not a relevant variable to explain the relation of the 
integration process and the Immigration Surplus. Since the coefficient of this 
regressor in the empirical model resulted to be insignificant, we can reject our second 
hypothesis and infer that encouraging integration through long term residence 
permits may not enhance the Immigration Surplus levels, at least during the period of 
economic downturns. 
Also, empirical model showed that there is a small but significant relation between the 
Immigration Surplus and two migrant integration policy indicators (“Access to labor 
markets” and “Access to Nationality”). This for the thirty seven selected countries 
during the years of 2007 to 2012. 
“Access to labor markets” showed a positive and significant coefficient with respect to 
the Immigration Surplus. The result will infer that during the years of 2007 to 2012, 
the integration of immigrants to host economies through the effective access to labor 
markets prompted an increase in the Immigrant Surplus. Thus, an increase of one unit 
in the migrant integration policy indicator of “Access to labor markets” should 
enhance in 0.00002007 units (0.002007%) the Immigration Surplus of a country. The 
Robust Standard Error in Regression 4.3 depicts a value of 0.000007328 (2.7388 
times smaller than our estimated coefficient) which address that the sample mean 
presented in the model is close to the mean of the overall population. 
As a result, we cannot reject our third hypothesis and infer that indeed, deeper 
integration to labor markets should lead to higher levels of immigration surplus and 
thus to an enlargement of the IS. 
“Access to nationality” presented a negative and significant coefficient with respect to 
the Immigration Surplus. The result will infer that during the years of 2007 to 2012, 
the integration of immigrants to host economies through the access to a legal status of 
membership to the particular country may decrease the Immigration Surplus. Thus, 




nationality” should reduce in 0.00004778 units (0.004778%) the Immigration Surplus 
of a country. The Robust Standard Error in Regression 4.3 depicts a value of 
0.00001085 (4.4037 times smaller than our estimated coefficient) which address that 
the sample mean presented in the model is close to the mean of the overall 
population. 
A possible reason that can explain the negative relation of the Immigration Surplus 
(2007-2012) and the “Access to nationality” relies on the idea that immigrants who 
acquire the nationality of the host country could be considered as more “valuable” in 
the labor markets (Danzer - Ulku, 2008). If the value of a worker increases may be 
reflected in a higher salary7. If salaries of immigrant labor forces increase, the 
redistribution of the national income proposed by Borjas (1994) will not have the 
same magnitude or impact and this may limit the effect of the IS. 
In relation with our fourth hypothesis, we infer that immigration policies that 
contribute on granting the nationality to immigrants do have an impact in the 
immigration surplus in a certain way. However, during the period of 2007 to 2012 
(economic downturn) this variable seemed to have a negative effect in relation to the 












                                                          
7
 “Holding German citizenship had a significant impact on the income levels”. • Danzer, Alexander M. Ulku, 
Hulya. "Determinants of Integration and its Impact on the Economic Success of Immigrants: A Case Study of 






International agreements and/or communities among countries, such as the European 
Union, have chosen to assume postures of better interconnected markets in order to 
promote free and undistorted competition within its members. As a result, labor 
markets have expanded the possibilities of demanders and suppliers to new 
territories. The free labor mobility (or less strict for non EU countries) has generated 
conflicted positions according to economic performance and the repercussions on 
wage levels and employment of local economies; especially because the public opinion 
is more sensitive to migration issues during economic downturns (OECD, 2009). 
In this section will be expressed conclusions and important observations resulted 
from the computations of the Immigration Surpluses and the situation regarding to 
integration of immigrants in host countries. Finally, it will be described the 
recommendation for migration policies that can enhance the positive results of the 
free mobility of labor forces and the path for further researches.  
The conclusions expressed here were built according to the concept of the 
Immigration Surplus developed by Borjas (1994). This concept assumes that a 
country can enhance the economic growth through variation in the national wages 
and a posterior redistribution of the national income as a result of the entry of 
foreign-born and/or third-country labor forces (Borjas, 1994).  
The previous chapter computed one hundred and ninety five levels of Immigration 
Surplus for thirty seven countries during the years 2007 to 2012; the results revealed 
that the magnitude of this indicator is very short in almost all the cases. Longhi, 
Nijkamp and Poot (2004) share similar proportions to these results with the outcome 
of their research. “We statistically summarized 344 estimates collected from a set of 18 
studies computing the percentage change in the wage of a native worker with respect to 
a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of immigrants over native workers.  Overall, 
the effect is very small. A 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of immigrants in 
the labour force lowers wages across the investigated studies by only 0.119%” (Longhi, 
Nijkamp and Poot, 2004). 
Also, several Immigration Surpluses computed in the research depicted a negative 
value during the years of 2007 to 2012. It is important to remember the event of the 
financial crisis that rose during this period of time and the implications that this 
episode might have originated in the economy and specifically in the respective labor 




OECD (2009) addressed that the consequences of the financial crisis on the labor 
market outcomes of immigrants were ambiguous; nevertheless, immigrants were 
among the groups that were considerably affected during this phenomenon. 
Immigrants represent a vulnerable group during economic downturns because of the 
following reasons: 
 Immigrants are employed usually in industry sectors that are more sensible to 
business cycles. 
 Have less secure contractual arrangements. 
 Represent a less skilled group of the labor force. 
 Self-employed immigrants have more risk to bankruptcy in their businesses. 
 Discrimination during hiring processes. (OECD, 2009) 
Proof of this immigrant’s vulnerability is that some countries that experimented a 
rapid increase in the migration inflows during the economic growth period8, now deal 
with severe structural problems of unemployment (e.g. Ireland and Spain) (OECD, 
2009). 
In the second chapter we described that: “The size of the immigration surplus will be 
conditioned by the elasticity factor price of labor and the increase in the national income 
will react proportionally to it. The greater the changes in wage due to an increase in the 
labor supply, the greater will be the resulting immigration surplus. Inversely, if the 
wages are not so sensitive to changes in the labor supply it will be hard to increase the 
income” (Borjas, 1994). Thus, if the labor market is not in the condition to react 
promptly to the changes resulted from a shock, the magnitude of the Immigration 
Surplus will be limited or possibly negative. Ruhs and Vargas (2012) affirm that 
during the economic downturn of 2008, the labor demand responded slower than 
during the preceding economic cycle (Ruhs - Vargas, 2012). 
With this references, we can infer that the values presented in Appendix G does not 
necessarily contradict Borjas theory, but could be hardly influenced by the 
deterioration of the global macroeconomic outlook during the years of 2007 to 2012. 
This project has also remarked that the level of integration of immigrants in a host 
country and the implementation of migration policies may impact the economic 
                                                          
8
 Between the years of 2003 to 2007 immigrants made important contribution to the employment growth, 
this helped to limit the wages and fuel the expansion phase of most of the OECD countries. During the same 
period unemployment rate decreased from 6.9% to 5.6%. 
Canada also represented an example of a country with high levels of immigrant inflows. During the 
economic growth phase of the 1990’s the outcomes of immigration caused several concerns because of the 
decline in the employment earnings and the rise of the rate of low income. This phenomenon helped to 




growth of a country. The results of “Determinants of Integration and its Impact on the 
Economic Success of Immigrants: A Case Study of the Turkish Community in Berlin” 
(Danzer - Ulku, 2008) provide evidence that shows that deeper integration can lead to 
higher levels of economic success. 
Zimmerman also reveals that the economic behavior of a country, where national and 
immigrant agents interact, may be influenced in a weak but significant way by the 
integration of the foreign-born and third-country labor forces (Zimmerman, 2007). 
Integration process can be shaped by various economic, political and social factors. 
Danzer and Ulku (2008) confirm in their research the link between integration and 
certain aspects such as labor market conditions, ethnic networks or immigrant’s skills, 
between others. “Integration variable is an outcome of other non-independent 
processes, and needs to be understood well before employing it as a determinant of 
economic behavior and success” (Danzer - Ulku, 2008). 
The financial crisis also influenced the level of integration of immigrants in a host 
economy. According to OECD (2009), "A strong macroeconomic shock may also 
jeopardize the medium and long-term integration of immigrants” (OECD, 2009). This 
impact can be explained because during the economic downturns the measures 
implemented to stimulate the economy may discriminate between national and 
immigrant workers. As a consequence, foreign-born or third-country workers will be 
excluded from the potential help that labor forces can receive from the supporting 
institutions and thus limit their level of integration. 
The outcome of the analysis confirms Borjas’, Strielkowski’s and Longhi’s conclusions 
about the positive effects of immigrants’ inclusion into foreign labor markets.  
This conclusion can be compared with the United States case. The U.S. does not have 
an explicit policy or program about integration of immigrants supported by any public 
institution. However, the flexibility and access conditions of the labor market facilitate 
the integration of immigrants. As a result of the high levels of employment, the 
immigrant labor forces are usually identified as hard-working individuals that can 
enhance the economy of the host country. As double side effect, this kind of reputation 
also helps the integration process (Chao, 2004). 
OECD (2009) also endorses the phenomenon that easy access to labor markets can 
enhance the national income of a country. In “International Migration Outlook 2009” 
(OECD, 2009) is explained that the dynamics of immigrant employment is determined 
by two aspects: 1. Better integration to the labor markets and 2. The entry of new 




Additionally, the inclusion of immigrant labor forces into a host society could also 
serve as a way to expand the consumer demand for goods and services and thus raise 
the labor demand. As a consequence, in the medium to long run, this event can boost 
the investment levels by national, foreign-born or third-country labor forces (Danzer - 
Ulku, 2008). 
Integration of immigrant through the access of nationality is described by Danzer and 
Ulku (2008) as: “A process of developing the membership in a specific society and 
gaining access to its political, economic and social resources” (Danzer - Ulku, 2008). If 
the population that has access to the national resources expands, the public 
expenditures may also follow the same path. A country that promotes the integration 
of immigrants in his territory should increase the economic incentives such as the 
investments into education, real access to labor markets, social assistance, healthcare, 
etc. (Danzer - Ulku, 2008). Thus, during an economic downturn the immigration 
surplus could be shrunken as a result of the increase of investments without 
substantial returns from the foreign labor force. 
The conclusions presented in this project indicate that the integration of immigrants 
can impact in certain way to the economic performance of a country through the effect 
of the Immigration Surplus. During the time period of 2007 to 2012, the impact was 
transmitted by two main channels, the real access to labor markets and the access to 
nationality.  
It is important to remark that even when the efforts to pursue the integration of 
immigrants into a host country assume positive outcomes in the national economy, 
the results may vary because of several factors such as the business cycles. 
The effect and impact of the Immigration Surplus can be limited or mitigated by 
economic, social and/or political shocks due to the vulnerability of these social sector; 
however, this mitigation effect seems very hard to be measured probably because of 
its complexity or limited indicators that can reproduce the economic performance of 
immigrants in foreign labor markets. 
Using the previous conclusions and the existent literature as a point of reference, the 
recommendations for migration policy are the following ones: 
 Governments and migration policy makers should maintain or enhance the 
integration programs promoting effective, fair and non-discriminative labor 
market policies in order to encourage the economic success of immigrants. 
 During periods of slow economic downturns or slow growth, policy makers should 




can leave the country unable to react quickly to general market conditions during 
the recovery phase (OECD, 2009). 
 Immigration conditions or requirements should not become stricter during 
economic downturns because this may lead to an increase in irregular migration 
levels. 
 Migrant sending countries should develop contingent strategies that can limit the 
contagion of negative economic shocks when remittances fall. Is important to 
remember that immigrant labor forces are hardly hit during economic or financial 
crisis. 
 The demographic condition of Europe indicates longevity and low fertility in the 
population (OECD, 2009). As a consequence, the labor forces will shrink in the 
near future. This may represent problems to cover the demands from the 
consumer markets or increase the contributors-pensioned ratio. 
 If the work forces of each country are not able to cover the labor demand with 
nationals, they will need to attract, or even compete, for immigrant labor forces. 
This will mean that governments should increase the incentives to bring foreign-
born or third-country workers to the local labor market. In order to prevent risk in 
the expenses of public sector, governments should invest in these incentives 
during periods of economic growth. 
This research give the guideline to further research models that will attempt to 
analyze the impact of migration in a host economy and the importance of 
integrating these immigrants into the society. The Migration Policy Institute will 
publish a new volume of the Migrant Policy Index (2013) in the spring of 2015; 
with this new information the researcher can replicate this investigation 
expanding the time period and give a wider perspective of the immigrant’s 











6. Appendix compilation 
Appendix A 
Labor income share (Unit labor cost) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Armenia 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 
Australia 0.5822 0.5816 0.5600 0.5608 0.5521 0.5564 0.5564 
Austria 0.6614 0.6530 0.6626 0.6856 0.6748 0.6681 0.6747 
Belgium 0.6706 0.6692 0.6817 0.6997 0.6853 0.6890 0.7047 
Bulgaria 0.5372 0.5659 0.5130 0.5130 0.4600 0.4600 0.4600 
Canada 0.6062 0.6069 0.5975 0.6288 0.6600 0.6600 0.6600 
Cyprus 0.6294 0.6208 0.6105 0.5802 0.5500 0.5500 0.5500 
Czech Republic 0.5829 0.5777 0.5861 0.5856 0.5907 0.5980 0.6067 
Denmark 0.6430 0.6509 0.6505 0.6864 0.6461 0.6501 0.6452 
Estonia 0.5532 0.5806 0.6217 0.6464 0.6084 0.5796 0.5862 
Finland 0.6338 0.6143 0.6356 0.6867 0.6729 0.6747 0.6861 
France 0.6757 0.6671 0.6691 0.6858 0.6864 0.6864 0.6904 
Germany 0.6657 0.6525 0.6623 0.6987 0.6781 0.6765 0.6851 
Greece 0.6466 0.6399 0.6079 0.6549 0.6594 0.6379 0.6022 
Hungary 0.6105 0.6212 0.6179 0.6189 0.5997 0.5946 0.6002 
Ireland 0.5764 0.5926 0.6498 0.6476 0.6087 0.5825 0.5676 
Italy 0.6708 0.6658 0.6716 0.6855 0.6859 0.6825 0.6868 
Japan 0.6014 0.5890 0.6033 0.6077 0.5912 0.6058 0.6058 
Latvia 0.5654 0.5950 0.6265 0.6282 0.6300 0.6300 0.6300 
Lithuania 0.5603 0.5761 0.5791 0.5596 0.5400 0.5400 0.5400 
Luxembourg 0.5186 0.5077 0.5545 0.5998 0.5631 0.5610 0.5727 
Malta 0.5100 0.5100 0.5400 0.5400 0.5700 0.5700 0.5700 
Netherlands 0.6656 0.6635 0.6661 0.6991 0.6879 0.6862 0.6965 
Norway 0.5049 0.5309 0.5171 0.5762 0.5552 0.5436 0.5460 
Poland 0.5415 0.5363 0.5604 0.5434 0.5462 0.5367 0.5317 
Portugal 0.6765 0.6628 0.6716 0.6753 0.6662 0.6612 0.6418 
Romania 0.6122 0.5692 0.5261 0.4831 0.4400 0.4400 0.4400 
Serbia 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 
Slovakia 0.4959 0.4954 0.4992 0.5349 0.5250 0.5228 0.5163 
Slovenia 0.6936 0.6821 0.6970 0.7342 0.7474 0.7342 0.7404 
South Korea 0.7753 0.7660 0.7636 0.7414 0.7062 0.7109 0.7176 
Spain 0.6308 0.6301 0.6375 0.6376 0.6370 0.6282 0.6098 
Sweden 0.6489 0.6572 0.6546 0.6730 0.6508 0.6409 0.6508 
Switzerland 0.6207 0.6140 0.6136 0.6436 0.6274 0.6383 0.6468 




UK 0.6815 0.6797 0.6764 0.6983 0.6957 0.6958 0.7048 
USA 0.6516 0.6511 0.6552 0.6484 0.6381 0.6374 0.6374 
Source: 
 The Labour Share of Income around the World, Evidence from a Panel Dataset Development 
Economics and Public Policy Cluster. Institute of Development Policy and Management, School 
of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. Available at  
http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/publications/wp/depp/documents/depp_w
p32.pdf 
 The labour income share in the European Union, Employment in Europe. Available at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2280&langId=en 
 Assessment of the Labour Market in Serbia, Wiener Institut für Internationale 
Wirtschaftsvergleiche. Available at  
http://wiiw.ac.at/assessment-of-the-labour-market-in-serbia-p-2348.html 





















 Total labor force ( Labor units) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Armenia 1,406,436.55 1,392,458.99 1,379,176.16 1,394,340.02 1,451,010.11 1,464,961.25 1,480,503.74 
Australia 10,806,942.76 11,085,529.45 11,357,176.96 11,568,762.18 11,732,823.49 11,873,749.92 12,005,996.51 
Austria 4,151,191.53 4,244,400.34 4,284,067.81 4,325,556.62 4,327,015.41 4,366,242.26 4,405,669.38 
Belgium 4,640,538.60 4,732,748.59 4,774,549.11 4,788,754.66 4,887,483.71 4,870,948.51 4,908,458.70 
Bulgaria 3,478,286.56 3,565,252.74 3,643,133.49 3,572,112.27 3,480,973.59 3,347,103.81 3,353,935.33 
Canada 17,925,315.34 18,318,195.40 18,648,747.58 18,785,081.32 18,984,515.22 19,144,603.31 19,341,079.24 
Cyprus 537,690.46 551,047.68 560,532.71 571,331.19 584,477.68 586,250.13 593,905.35 
Czech Republic 5,195,072.01 5,204,639.81 5,231,733.15 5,275,721.77 5,262,607.66 5,242,209.53 5,282,718.07 
Denmark 2,933,042.86 2,933,486.22 2,966,071.98 2,952,487.04 2,930,964.72 2,930,445.23 2,913,883.02 
Estonia 693,580.75 695,215.51 702,063.94 699,639.88 696,136.73 705,031.10 697,884.19 
Finland 2,682,611.07 2,709,258.74 2,736,986.60 2,710,909.61 2,700,262.62 2,714,984.27 2,719,839.51 
France 28,946,653.25 29,188,500.34 29,412,153.86 29,677,817.40 29,839,937.73 29,904,922.36 30,126,306.42 
Germany 41,605,652.23 41,860,106.24 41,939,193.47 41,983,039.05 41,990,452.26 42,490,516.98 42,522,729.59 
Greece 5,108,401.93 5,118,383.82 5,136,117.80 5,201,963.92 5,219,816.85 5,155,669.21 5,125,115.64 
Hungary 4,309,122.49 4,296,178.13 4,272,341.31 4,272,864.84 4,310,481.31 4,334,179.99 4,397,753.49 
Ireland 2,130,060.17 2,195,094.78 2,206,695.73 2,179,005.06 2,143,229.12 2,170,984.05 2,167,325.29 
Italy 24,817,231.75 24,901,925.68 25,250,657.31 25,094,034.07 25,059,918.36 25,107,059.03 25,658,144.20 
Japan 66,605,674.62 66,808,379.53 66,630,898.45 66,296,543.64 66,420,608.98 65,569,737.03 65,281,089.81 
Latvia 1,163,127.50 1,183,621.84 1,205,212.78 1,174,115.06 1,134,026.92 1,036,890.94 1,041,670.25 
Lithuania 1,594,616.50 1,607,313.95 1,618,572.38 1,647,478.28 1,638,266.59 1,540,154.43 1,535,510.04 
Luxembourg 213,562.45 216,281.78 221,180.21 234,862.60 237,978.11 242,807.83 253,115.73 
Malta 166,048.94 170,227.41 172,691.70 174,427.78 178,308.50 181,379.86 185,672.70 
Netherlands 11,257,862.65 11,268,007.99 11,300,787.42 11,374,549.55 11,445,603.13 11,507,528.76 11,577,842.47 
Norway 2,454,507.67 2,516,076.42 2,592,052.41 2,595,142.13 2,608,239.80 2,633,450.15 2,674,699.64 




Portugal 5,579,415.22 5,615,587.38 5,620,028.87 5,577,679.28 5,587,034.70 5,498,286.34 5,472,450.06 
Romania 10,253,562.21 10,253,235.08 10,205,931.66 10,170,506.67 10,221,032.96 10,121,191.68 10,199,999.99 
Serbia 2,630,691.00 2,655,736.00 2,821,724.00 2,616,437.00 2,396,244.00 2,253,209.00 2,228,343.00 
Slovakia 2,662,279.02 2,664,387.67 2,707,015.53 2,703,000.65 2,719,124.11 2,706,401.90 2,736,136.56 
Slovenia 1,023,040.77 1,038,356.41 1,034,977.69 1,044,098.62 1,044,576.33 1,024,814.41 1,021,221.35 
South Korea 24,182,951.44 24,468,116.24 24,624,459.88 24,633,579.91 24,955,045.84 25,379,945.71 25,765,233.89 
Spain 21,714,366.25 22,263,361.57 22,887,040.73 23,075,327.21 23,202,824.49 23,257,658.16 23,280,057.08 
Sweden 4,806,372.34 4,864,134.32 4,914,929.29 4,926,876.61 4,972,086.94 5,038,025.96 5,080,956.09 
Switzerland 4,236,725.87 4,307,720.26 4,408,492.51 4,482,630.09 4,513,246.60 4,585,297.42 4,640,484.76 
Turkey 22,641,187.99 23,044,417.44 23,752,996.99 24,737,115.66 25,644,596.21 26,634,364.80 27,050,106.65 
UK 31,083,614.84 31,171,097.12 31,555,454.68 31,684,438.33 31,777,156.06 32,029,362.80 32,377,782.48 
USA 154,694,539.76 155,976,570.18 157,724,795.63 157,889,958.41 157,453,653.38 157,567,914.11 158,686,471.55 
Source: 
 Labor Force, Total, The World Bank. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN 












 Year to year percentage change in total labor force 
 2006 - 2007 2007 - 2008 2008 - 2009 2009 - 2010 2010 - 2011 2011 - 2012 
Armenia -0.9938% -0.9539% 1.0995% 4.0643% 0.9615% 1.0609% 
Australia 2.5778% 2.4505% 1.8630% 1.4181% 1.2011% 1.1138% 
Austria 2.2454% 0.9346% 0.9684% 0.0337% 0.9066% 0.9030% 
Belgium 1.9871% 0.8832% 0.2975% 2.0617% -0.3383% 0.7701% 
Bulgaria 2.5003% 2.1844% -1.9495% -2.5514% -3.8458% 0.2041% 
Canada 2.1918% 1.8045% 0.7311% 1.0617% 0.8433% 1.0263% 
Cyprus 2.4842% 1.7213% 1.9265% 2.3010% 0.3033% 1.3058% 
Czech Republic 0.1842% 0.5206% 0.8408% -0.2486% -0.3876% 0.7727% 
Denmark 0.0151% 1.1108% -0.4580% -0.7290% -0.0177% -0.5652% 
Estonia 0.2357% 0.9851% -0.3453% -0.5007% 1.2777% -1.0137% 
Finland 0.9933% 1.0234% -0.9528% -0.3927% 0.5452% 0.1788% 
France 0.8355% 0.7662% 0.9032% 0.5463% 0.2178% 0.7403% 
Germany 0.6116% 0.1889% 0.1045% 0.0177% 1.1909% 0.0758% 
Greece 0.1954% 0.3465% 1.2820% 0.3432% -1.2289% -0.5926% 
Hungary -0.3004% -0.5548% 0.0123% 0.8804% 0.5498% 1.4668% 
Ireland 3.0532% 0.5285% -1.2548% -1.6418% 1.2950% -0.1685% 
Italy 0.3413% 1.4004% -0.6203% -0.1360% 0.1881% 2.1949% 
Japan 0.3043% -0.2657% -0.5018% 0.1871% -1.2810% -0.4402% 
Latvia 1.7620% 1.8241% -2.5803% -3.4143% -8.5656% 0.4609% 
Lithuania 0.7963% 0.7005% 1.7859% -0.5591% -5.9888% -0.3016% 
Luxembourg 1.2733% 2.2648% 6.1861% 1.3265% 2.0295% 4.2453% 
Malta 2.5164% 1.4476% 1.0053% 2.2248% 1.7225% 2.3668% 
Netherlands 0.0901% 0.2909% 0.6527% 0.6247% 0.5410% 0.6110% 
Norway 2.5084% 3.0196% 0.1192% 0.5047% 0.9666% 1.5664% 
Poland -0.0100% 1.4616% 1.6050% 1.5254% 1.3739% 0.7583% 
Portugal 0.6483% 0.0791% -0.7535% 0.1677% -1.5885% -0.4699% 
Romania -0.0032% -0.4614% -0.3471% 0.4968% -0.9768% 0.7786% 
Serbia 0.9520% 6.2502% -7.2752% -8.4158% -5.9691% -1.1036% 
Slovakia 0.0792% 1.5999% -0.1483% 0.5965% -0.4679% 1.0987% 
Slovenia 1.4971% -0.3254% 0.8813% 0.0458% -1.8919% -0.3506% 
South Korea 1.1792% 0.6390% 0.0370% 1.3050% 1.7027% 1.5181% 
Spain 2.5283% 2.8014% 0.8227% 0.5525% 0.2363% 0.0963% 
Sweden 1.2018% 1.0443% 0.2431% 0.9176% 1.3262% 0.8521% 
Switzerland 1.6757% 2.3393% 1.6817% 0.6830% 1.5964% 1.2036% 
Turkey 1.7810% 3.0748% 4.1431% 3.6685% 3.8596% 1.5609% 
UK 0.2814% 1.2331% 0.4088% 0.2926% 0.7937% 1.0878% 
USA 0.8287% 1.1208% 0.1047% -0.2763% 0.0726% 0.7099% 






 Average annual wages 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Currency 
Armenia 747,516.00 890,724.00 1,048,872.00 1,152,228.00 1,231,824.00 1,297,104.00 1,357,956.00 AMD 
Australia 46,274.82 47,554.48 73,879.23 46,904.51 47,793.47 48,752.75 49,655.22 USD 
Austria 22,689.83 23,390.35 24,027.42 24,425.96 24,859.68 25,349.63 26,283.09 EUR 
Belgium 23,106.35 23,744.58 25,218.99 25,370.80 25,589.47 26,540.91 28,980.45 EUR 
Bulgaria 1,364.15 1,612.13 2,014.74 2,229.54 2,275.63 2,558.49 2,710.66 EUR 
Canada 41,884.57 42,901.96 43,430.10 43,878.31 44,009.13 44,477.41 45,520.66 USD 
Cyprus 19,635.00 20,391.00 21,606.00 22,440.00 22,974.00 23,613.00 24,006.00 EUR 
Czech Republic 5,563.00 6,094.84 7,377.51 7,144.48 7,613.68 7,914.69 8,003.58 EUR 
Denmark 22,180.96 23,246.45 24,094.69 24,646.87 25,248.95 25,692.58 26,361.65 EUR 
Estonia 4,969.12 5,794.57 6,353.39 6,395.70 6,438.00 6,663.55 7,394.71 EUR 
Finland 20,796.66 22,046.58 23,170.64 23,643.06 24,449.15 25,385.06 25,580.24 EUR 
France 18,823.23 19,535.83 20,307.28 20,613.61 21,165.91 21,926.16 22,209.36 EUR 
Germany 23,597.06 24,180.00 24,739.09 24,552.11 25,296.90 26,252.91 26,485.86 EUR 
Greece 9,797.23 10,589.92 10,693.01 11,871.80 13,098.62 10,110.60 14,295.87 EUR 
Hungary 5,111.73 5,819.19 6,293.04 5,776.22 5,858.37 6,034.92 5,668.33 EUR 
Ireland 16,237.57 16,917.86 17,658.38 17,252.59 17,527.09 17,816.51 17,639.07 EUR 
Italy 16,669.16 17,041.62 17,728.44 18,107.51 18,639.13 19,171.74 19,359.63 EUR 
Japan 19,287.07 17,472.55 17,878.17 20,910.91 23,355.39 24,604.68 27,322.42 EUR 
Latvia 3,233.25 4,151.11 5,030.92 5,137.18 5,095.70 5,315.83 5,624.47 EUR 
Lithuania 3,376.33 4,147.50 4,852.93 4,522.84 4,439.13 4,555.16 4,764.75 EUR 
Luxembourg 24,785.56 25,769.03 26,179.36 26,867.20 27,496.69 28,016.00 29,061.22 EUR 
Malta 8,164.08 8,354.51 9,021.60 9,207.14 9,651.90 10,571.73 10,971.96 EUR 
Netherlands 22,132.84 22,847.63 23,477.10 24,123.00 24,649.91 24,969.61 25,730.49 EUR 
Norway 28,001.52 29,613.57 30,240.39 29,206.60 33,064.14 35,360.93 38,637.98 EUR 




Portugal 9,214.76 9,956.32 10,327.29 10,598.57 10,736.52 10,882.88 10,543.50 EUR 
Romania 2,413.61 3,073.49 3,436.55 3,217.61 3,567.16 3,836.08 3,606.38 EUR 
Serbia 260,942.00 333,425.00 393,086.00 381,094.00 409,911.00 456,002.00 496,632.00 RSD 
Slovakia 3,787.20 5,046.11 5,565.42 5,706.13 5,883.94 6,094.20 6,272.02 EUR 
Slovenia 7,945.16 8,489.90 9,153.74 9,333.88 9,818.99 9,908.23 10,180.81 EUR 
South Korea 27,197.23 27,686.28 27,574.04 27,593.18 27,885.73 28,271.46 28,725.21 USD 
Spain 13,822.59 14,309.52 15,131.17 15,694.62 16,098.43 16,382.09 16,818.30 EUR 
Sweden 23,199.99 24,108.60 24,270.95 22,418.14 25,368.71 27,319.80 29,237.97 EUR 
Switzerland 24,399.79 24,184.49 24,884.07 26,366.77 28,938.70 33,334.02 38,310.81 EUR 
Turkey 5,253.92 5,861.79 6,015.79 5,038.22 6,319.80 5,640.12 7,354.27 EUR 
UK 25,046.10 26,402.40 22,766.58 20,316.03 21,696.34 21,354.13 23,905.35 EUR 
USA 16,924.71 16,265.73 16,088.45 17,751.53 19,209.90 18,724.73 20,910.82 EUR 
Currencies:  
AMD - Armenia Dram EUR – Euro RSD - Serbian Dinar USD - United States Dollar  
Source: 
 Average Annual Wages, OECD Statistics. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE 
 Average monthly nominal wages, drams / 2014, National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia. Available at 
http://www.armstat.am/en/?nid=126&id=08001 
 Annual Net Earnings, Eurostat. 05 2014. European Commission. Available at 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=earn_nt_net& 








 Year to year percentage change in average annual wages 
 2006 - 2007 2007 - 2008 2008 - 2009 2009 - 2010 2010 - 2011 2011 - 2012 
Armenia 19.158% 17.755% 9.854% 6.908% 5.299% 4.691% 
Australia 2.765% 55.357% -36.512% 1.895% 2.007% 1.851% 
Austria 3.087% 2.724% 1.659% 1.776% 1.971% 3.682% 
Belgium 2.762% 6.209% 0.602% 0.862% 3.718% 9.192% 
Bulgaria 18.178% 24.974% 10.661% 2.067% 12.430% 5.948% 
Canada 2.429% 1.231% 1.032% 0.298% 1.064% 2.346% 
Cyprus 3.850% 5.959% 3.860% 2.380% 2.781% 1.664% 
Czech Republic 9.560% 21.045% -3.159% 6.567% 3.954% 1.123% 
Denmark 4.804% 3.649% 2.292% 2.443% 1.757% 2.604% 
Estonia 16.612% 9.644% 0.666% 0.661% 3.503% 10.973% 
Finland 6.010% 5.099% 2.039% 3.409% 3.828% 0.769% 
France 3.786% 3.949% 1.508% 2.679% 3.592% 1.292% 
Germany 2.470% 2.312% -0.756% 3.034% 3.779% 0.887% 
Greece 8.091% 0.973% 11.024% 10.334% -22.812% 41.395% 
Hungary 13.840% 8.143% -8.213% 1.422% 3.014% -6.074% 
Ireland 4.190% 4.377% -2.298% 1.591% 1.651% -0.996% 
Italy 2.234% 4.030% 2.138% 2.936% 2.857% 0.980% 
Japan -9.408% 2.321% 16.963% 11.690% 5.349% 11.046% 
Latvia 28.388% 21.195% 2.112% -0.807% 4.320% 5.806% 
Lithuania 22.840% 17.009% -6.802% -1.851% 2.614% 4.601% 
Luxembourg 3.968% 1.592% 2.627% 2.343% 1.889% 3.731% 
Malta 2.333% 7.985% 2.057% 4.831% 9.530% 3.786% 
Netherlands 3.230% 2.755% 2.751% 2.184% 1.297% 3.047% 
Norway 5.757% 2.117% -3.419% 13.208% 6.946% 9.267% 
Poland 13.593% 10.540% -16.035% 12.194% 3.482% 1.102% 
Portugal 8.048% 3.726% 2.627% 1.302% 1.363% -3.118% 
Romania 27.340% 11.813% -6.371% 10.864% 7.539% -5.988% 
Serbia 27.777% 17.893% -3.051% 7.562% 11.244% 8.910% 
Slovakia 33.241% 10.291% 2.528% 3.116% 3.573% 2.918% 
Slovenia 6.856% 7.819% 1.968% 5.197% 0.909% 2.751% 
South Korea 1.798% -0.405% 0.069% 1.060% 1.383% 1.605% 
Spain 3.523% 5.742% 3.724% 2.573% 1.762% 2.663% 
Sweden 3.916% 0.673% -7.634% 13.162% 7.691% 7.021% 
Switzerland -0.882% 2.893% 5.958% 9.754% 15.188% 14.930% 
Turkey 11.570% 2.627% -16.250% 25.437% -10.755% 30.392% 
UK 5.415% -13.771% -10.764% 6.794% -1.577% 11.947% 
USA -3.894% -1.090% 10.337% 8.215% -2.526% 11.675% 
Source: Own computations based on OECD Statistics, National Service of Republic of Armenia, Eurostat 





 International Migrant Stock 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Armenia 13.64% 13.64% 12.29% 10.94% 10.13% 9.23% 
Australia 21.30% 21.30% 21.33% 21.35% 21.36% 21.38% 
Austria 14.84% 14.84% 15.23% 15.62% 15.86% 16.12% 
Belgium 8.68% 8.68% 8.82% 8.95% 9.03% 9.12% 
Bulgaria 1.38% 1.38% 1.40% 1.42% 1.43% 1.44% 
Canada 20.30% 20.30% 20.70% 21.10% 21.34% 21.60% 
Cyprus 12.61% 12.61% 13.29% 13.97% 14.38% 14.83% 
Czech Republic 4.36% 4.36% 4.33% 4.30% 4.28% 4.26% 
Denmark 8.24% 8.24% 8.47% 8.71% 8.85% 9.01% 
Estonia 14.30% 14.30% 13.95% 13.61% 13.40% 13.18% 
Finland 3.73% 3.73% 3.97% 4.20% 4.34% 4.50% 
France 10.26% 10.26% 10.27% 10.27% 10.27% 10.27% 
Germany 13.00% 13.00% 13.08% 13.15% 13.19% 13.24% 
Greece 9.40% 9.40% 9.70% 10.01% 10.19% 10.40% 
Hungary 3.49% 3.49% 3.59% 3.68% 3.74% 3.80% 
Ireland 17.46% 17.46% 18.77% 20.08% 20.86% 21.74% 
Italy 6.30% 6.30% 6.84% 7.37% 7.69% 8.05% 
Japan 1.63% 1.63% 1.67% 1.70% 1.72% 1.74% 
Latvia 15.73% 15.73% 15.35% 14.96% 14.73% 14.47% 
Lithuania 4.38% 4.38% 4.15% 3.92% 3.78% 3.63% 
Luxembourg 33.87% 33.87% 34.02% 34.17% 34.26% 34.36% 
Malta 3.30% 3.30% 3.50% 3.71% 3.83% 3.97% 
Netherlands 10.59% 10.59% 10.56% 10.54% 10.53% 10.51% 
Norway 8.97% 8.97% 9.44% 9.92% 10.21% 10.52% 
Poland 2.16% 2.16% 2.16% 2.16% 2.16% 2.16% 
Portugal 7.93% 7.93% 8.28% 8.63% 8.84% 9.07% 
Romania 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 
Serbia 8.13% 8.13% 7.67% 7.20% 6.92% 6.61% 
Slovakia 2.36% 2.36% 2.38% 2.41% 2.42% 2.44% 
Slovenia 8.18% 8.18% 8.09% 8.00% 7.95% 7.88% 
South Korea 1.11% 1.11% 1.10% 1.08% 1.07% 1.06% 
Spain 12.23% 12.23% 13.03% 13.84% 14.32% 14.86% 
Sweden 13.12% 13.12% 13.52% 13.92% 14.16% 14.43% 
Switzerland 22.42% 22.42% 22.47% 22.52% 22.55% 22.58% 
Turkey 1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.95% 1.95% 
UK 10.03% 10.03% 10.19% 10.36% 10.46% 10.57% 
USA 13.56% 13.56% 13.70% 13.84% 13.92% 14.01% 






 Immigration Surplus (As percentage of the total economy) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Armenia 0.037386% 0.032588% -0.056040% -0.295497% -0.073984% -0.073079% 
Australia -1.225181% -0.056135% 0.064937% -0.937630% -0.757280% -0.763003% 
Austria -0.468979% -0.237190% -0.440602% -0.014106% -0.356323% -0.201825% 
Belgium -0.170577% -0.035451% -0.130393% -0.618122% 0.024370% -0.023645% 
Bulgaria -0.000704% -0.000417% 0.000896% 0.005424% 0.001397% -0.000159% 
Canada -1.042265% -1.735571% -0.918171% -4.844829% -1.120869% -0.642825% 
Cyprus -0.253418% -0.125482% -0.230221% -0.422802% -0.052956% -0.421074% 
Czech Republic -0.001091% -0.001401% 0.014843% 0.002129% 0.005502% -0.038590% 
Denmark -0.000618% -0.063392% 0.046548% 0.065414% 0.002354% 0.053115% 
Estonia -0.009244% -0.068036% 0.342468% 0.470545% -0.205758% 0.050157% 
Finland -0.005419% -0.007816% 0.022367% 0.005403% -0.007560% -0.014074% 
France -0.077408% -0.068319% -0.216234% -0.073693% -0.021933% -0.208671% 
Germany -0.133375% -0.045205% 0.081665% -0.003336% -0.182214% -0.050610% 
Greece -0.005958% -0.089354% -0.033617% -0.009665% -0.016176% 0.004319% 
Hungary 0.000735% 0.002428% 0.000056% -0.022618% -0.006972% 0.009813% 
Ireland -0.476005% -0.102379% -0.539276% 0.957786% -0.804878% -0.193634% 
Italy -0.013931% -0.038820% 0.039491% 0.006307% -0.010498% -0.417749% 
Japan 0.000233% 0.000882% 0.000239% -0.000126% 0.002014% 0.000349% 
Latvia -0.050280% -0.070022% 0.949603% -3.296203% 1.470800% -0.055966% 
Lithuania -0.002355% -0.002536% 0.014100% -0.015657% 0.106574% 0.002719% 
Luxembourg -0.918340% -4.485016% -8.102210% -1.828956% -3.488760% -3.804210% 
Malta -0.022910% -0.004680% -0.014354% -0.014276% -0.006324% -0.024524% 
Netherlands -0.010467% -0.039590% -0.092952% -0.110248% -0.159702% -0.077575% 
Norway -0.074311% -0.265975% 0.008079% -0.008532% -0.033727% -0.045404% 
Poland 0.000009% -0.001816% 0.001270% -0.001596% -0.004943% -0.008535% 
Portugal -0.013993% -0.004104% 0.060981% -0.027028% 0.264254% -0.036013% 
Romania 0.000000% 0.000039% -0.000050% -0.000038% 0.000109% 0.000110% 
Serbia -0.008452% -0.077500% -0.473248% 0.220863% 0.093608% 0.019262% 
Slovakia -0.000031% -0.002114% 0.000872% -0.002794% 0.001942% -0.005627% 
Slovenia -0.052104% 0.009927% -0.110066% -0.002202% 0.500246% 0.030197% 
South Korea -0.003293% 0.007674% -0.002453% -0.005389% -0.005273% -0.003973% 
Spain -0.254923% -0.202923% -0.105319% -0.102292% -0.071578% -0.021122% 
Sweden -0.153186% -0.821774% 0.018452% -0.039067% -0.101024% -0.076526% 
Switzerland 2.903361% -1.241307% -0.456492% -0.110384% -0.169350% -0.132224% 
Turkey -0.001039% -0.007056% 0.001355% -0.000666% 0.001652% -0.000236% 
UK -0.016595% 0.029440% 0.013329% -0.015062% 0.181900% -0.034440% 
USA 0.122339% 0.607195% -0.006042% 0.019742% 0.017190% -0.037116% 
Source: Own computations based on World Bank Data Base, Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Serbia, OECD Statistics, National Service of Republic of Armenia, Eurostat, Cekos in, World 






Immigration Surplus (Expressed in current U.S. dollars) 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Armenia 3,441,894.84 3,800,414.94 - 4,846,347.31 - 27,363,935.00 - 7,503,728.08 - 7,271,743.02 
Australia - 10,461,264,381.98 - 592,505,592.68 601,777,786.69 - 10,705,802,879.74 - 10,502,628,197.73 - 11,692,321,181.04 
Austria - 1,758,865,338.60 - 982,370,424.87 - 1,690,740,001.01 - 52,927,988.74 - 1,480,918,226.63 - 796,619,809.81 
Belgium - 784,005,518.12 - 179,870,740.66 - 617,091,106.00 - 2,893,299,553.07 124,983,420.68 - 114,266,059.25 
Bulgaria - 296,349.77 - 216,150.36 435,242.83 2,588,852.18 748,058.80 - 81,122.24 
Canada -  14,842,538,325.75 - 26,080,048,549.36 - 12,281,247,634.78 - 76,404,897,622.22 - 19,926,676,226.77 - 11,708,574,295.93 
Cyprus - 55,351,045.97 - 31,773,914.13 - 54,200,144.89 - 97,804,377.49 - 13,160,144.21 - 95,865,531.59 
Czech Republic - 1,969,688.63 - 3,158,547.49 29,273,599.63 4,225,793.64 11,883,882.14 - 75,808,338.04 
Denmark - 1,923,224.23 - 217,993,915.37 144,550,933.88 204,985,712.67 7,854,977.46 167,253,981.77 
Estonia - 2,033,131.17 - 16,180,102.02 66,461,537.77 88,977,112.94 - 46,342,517.02 11,230,258.35 
Finland - 13,337,564.01 - 21,258,054.91 53,542,583.46 12,704,776.82 - 19,812,063.56 - 34,840,672.04 
France - 1,998,971,487.74 - 1,934,651,574.85 - 5,664,636,785.44 - 1,877,926,424.44 - 609,664,840.97 - 5,452,310,688.23 
Germany - 4,433,116,371.88 - 1,638,085,672.92 2,693,489,001.36 - 109,502,175.99 - 6,605,000,110.32 - 1,734,974,267.16 
Greece - 18,196,601.27 - 305,229,427.96 - 107,915,077.18 - 28,251,011.59 - 46,850,446.14 10,758,605.17 
Hungary 1,000,276.71 3,744,915.44 71,256.79 - 28,838,739.66 - 9,582,940.73 12,226,953.57 
Ireland - 1,235,584,703.18 - 270,315,595.58 - 1,215,758,946.94 1,992,405,430.89 - 1,817,680,791.12 - 408,124,624.26 
Italy - 296,339,373.49 - 895,701,102.60 833,716,199.51 128,789,476.77 - 230,441,455.56 - 8,416,264,973.82 
Japan 10,156,262.80 42,764,186.59 12,056,301.68 - 6,927,756.41 118,738,638.61 20,791,494.32 
Latvia - 14,463,320.56 - 23,576,047.58 245,717,318.64 - 791,407,781.26 418,888,908.82 - 15,879,016.09 
Lithuania - 920,857.49 - 1,198,450.82 5,195,439.82 - 5,684,413.70 45,690,453.23 1,151,383.51 
Luxembourg - 471,297,965.40 - 2,455,220,509.40 - 4,004,174,923.28 - 945,825,203.23 - 2,022,012,665.66 - 2,099,104,009.21 
Malta - 1,721,442.85 - 400,301.68 - 1,162,618.68 - 1,165,502.41 - 578,804.14 - 2,138,931.91 
Netherlands - 81,913,123.88 - 344,757,994.89 - 740,208,249.42 - 851,213,005.56 - 1,328,736,190.86 - 597,757,984.45 
Norway - 292,397,453.68 - 1,207,221,463.66 30,605,723.80 - 35,937,772.57 - 165,622,482.62 - 226,868,328.26 




Portugal - 32,426,721.20 - 10,338,030.39 142,767,844.82 - 61,474,204.83 628,066,786.81 - 76,445,179.48 
Romania 214.05 80,071.81 - 82,629.88 - 63,208.38 207,055.89 211,376.82 
Serbia - 3,292,179.93 - 37,014,265.28 - 190,479,755.48 81,697,091.83 40,524,578.07 7,221,272.40 
Slovakia - 26,490.18 - 2,069,865.84 761,024.47 - 2,433,106.02 1,862,066.91 - 5,129,006.88 
Slovenia - 24,648,940.82 5,420,938.68 - 53,994,211.69 - 1,033,151.57 251,374,687.21 13,673,014.45 
South Korea - 34,553,053.34 71,477,424.78 - 20,455,436.44 - 54,692,998.71 - 58,764,588.42 - 44,883,389.67 
Spain - 3,674,533,329.99 - 3,233,419,477.23 - 1,531,691,767.34 - 1,407,346,710.30 - 1,040,190,880.78 - 279,436,428.35 
Sweden - 708,506,647.17 - 3,995,124,629.41 74,875,112.78 - 180,840,934.70 - 541,782,327.72 - 400,849,740.73 
Switzerland 13,080,456,206.49 - 6,508,038,375.02 - 2,325,677,039.47 - 607,817,172.54 - 1,113,339,373.34 - 834,563,720.33 
Turkey - 6,722,708.24 - 51,529,127.53 8,324,982.66 - 4,870,901.70 12,798,067.33 - 1,859,149.92 
UK - 474,144,982.30 791,274,496.09 294,313,787.84 - 344,248,968.42 4,509,179,340.27 - 851,276,881.90 
USA 17,715,081,076.63 89,380,937,814.91 - 871,139,384.27 2,953,037,542.29 2,670,296,499.60 - 6,029,305,617.73 
Source: Own computations based on World Bank Data Base, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, OECD Statistics, National Service of 













 MIPEX: 2007 - 2009 




Access to labor 
markets 






Austria 43.75 50.00 50.00 0.00 75.00 
Belgium 52.71 40.00 83.33 37.50 50.00 
Canada 76.67 90.00 66.67 50.00 100.00 
Cyprus 20.83 0.00 33.33 12.50 37.50 
Czech Republic 54.79 90.00 66.67 12.50 50.00 
Denmark 63.75 80.00 50.00 50.00 75.00 
Estonia 65.21 40.00 83.33 62.50 75.00 
Finland 71.04 80.00 66.67 62.50 75.00 
France 48.75 20.00 50.00 62.50 62.50 
Germany 76.88 70.00 50.00 87.50 100.00 
Greece 44.58 20.00 83.33 0.00 75.00 
Hungary 36.46 50.00 33.33 12.50 50.00 
Ireland 42.29 40.00 16.67 25.00 87.50 
Italy 68.96 80.00 83.33 25.00 87.50 
Latvia 27.29 30.00 16.67 12.50 50.00 
Lithuania 46.25 60.00 50.00 25.00 50.00 
Luxembourg 44.58 20.00 83.33 0.00 75.00 
Malta 48.13 80.00 50.00 12.50 50.00 
Netherlands 85.42 100.00 66.67 75.00 100.00 
Norway 76.25 80.00 50.00 75.00 100.00 
Poland 45.42 40.00 66.67 12.50 62.50 
Portugal 80.21 100.00 83.33 37.50 100.00 
Slovakia 20.83 0.00 33.33 0.00 50.00 




Spain 79.38 80.00 100.00 50.00 87.50 
Sweden 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Switzerland 52.50 60.00 50.00 37.50 62.50 
UK 55.42 80.00 66.67 25.00 50.00 


















 MIPEX: 2010 - 2012 
 Policy area: Labor market mobility 
 Labor Market 
Mobility 
Access to labor 
markets 






Armenia 51.25 80.00 50.00 12.50 62.50 
Australia 58.13 70.00 50.00 50.00 62.50 
Austria 56.25 50.00 50.00 50.00 75.00 
Belgium 52.71 40.00 83.33 37.50 50.00 
Bulgaria 40.42 70.00 16.67 25.00 50.00 
Canada 80.83 90.00 83.33 50.00 100.00 
Cyprus 20.83 0.00 33.33 12.50 37.50 
Czech Republic 54.79 90.00 66.67 12.50 50.00 
Denmark 73.13 80.00 50.00 87.50 75.00 
Estonia 65.21 40.00 83.33 62.50 75.00 
Finland 71.04 80.00 66.67 62.50 75.00 
France 48.75 20.00 50.00 62.50 62.50 
Germany 76.88 70.00 50.00 87.50 100.00 
Greece 49.58 40.00 83.33 0.00 75.00 
Hungary 41.46 70.00 33.33 12.50 50.00 
Ireland 39.17 40.00 16.67 12.50 87.50 
Italy 68.96 80.00 83.33 25.00 87.50 
Japan 61.67 80.00 66.67 12.50 87.50 
Latvia 35.63 30.00 50.00 12.50 50.00 
Lithuania 46.25 60.00 50.00 25.00 50.00 
Luxembourg 47.71 20.00 83.33 12.50 75.00 
Malta 43.13 60.00 50.00 12.50 50.00 
Netherlands 85.42 100.00 66.67 75.00 100.00 




Poland 47.92 50.00 66.67 12.50 62.50 
Portugal 93.75 100.00 100.00 75.00 100.00 
Romania 67.71 50.00 83.33 37.50 100.00 
Serbia 36.25 70.00 0.00 0.00 75.00 
Slovakia 20.83 0.00 33.33 0.00 50.00 
Slovenia 44.38 40.00 50.00 12.50 75.00 
South Korea 81.04 70.00 66.67 87.50 100.00 
Spain 84.38 100.00 100.00 50.00 87.50 
Sweden 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Switzerland 52.50 60.00 50.00 37.50 62.50 
Turkey 10.42 0.00 16.67 12.50 12.50 
UK 55.42 80.00 66.67 25.00 50.00 
USA 67.71 100.00 83.33 25.00 62.50 













 MIPEX: 2007 - 2009 
 Policy area: Family reunion 
 Family reunion Eligibility Acquisition conditions Security of status Rights associated 
Austria 43.33 40.00 33.33 50.00 50.00 
Belgium 70.42 65.00 75.00 75.00 66.67 
Canada 89.17 90.00 66.67 100.00 100.00 
Cyprus 39.17 15.00 50.00 50.00 41.67 
Czech Republic 66.46 70.00 66.67 62.50 66.67 
Denmark 36.85 20.00 48.21 37.50 41.67 
Estonia 64.79 55.00 75.00 62.50 66.67 
Finland 69.79 75.00 83.33 62.50 58.33 
France 52.80 35.00 38.69 62.50 75.00 
Germany 62.11 55.00 64.29 62.50 66.67 
Greece 47.08 30.00 50.00 50.00 58.33 
Hungary 56.46 80.00 58.33 37.50 50.00 
Ireland 35.83 35.00 58.33 25.00 25.00 
Italy 77.71 65.00 66.67 87.50 91.67 
Latvia 46.25 60.00 66.67 0.00 58.33 
Lithuania 58.96 65.00 75.00 37.50 58.33 
Luxembourg 53.33 55.00 58.33 75.00 25.00 
Malta 50.21 30.00 50.00 62.50 58.33 
Netherlands 59.32 45.00 42.26 50.00 100.00 
Norway 72.08 80.00 54.17 62.50 91.67 
Poland 67.08 60.00 58.33 75.00 75.00 
Portugal 88.54 100.00 75.00 87.50 91.67 
Slovakia 52.92 70.00 58.33 50.00 33.33 
Slovenia 74.79 70.00 91.67 62.50 75.00 




Sweden 88.54 100.00 75.00 87.50 91.67 
Switzerland 39.79 30.00 25.00 62.50 41.67 
UK 56.25 50.00 58.33 75.00 41.67 



















MIPEX: 2010 - 2012 
 
Policy area: Family reunion 
 
Family reunion Eligibility Acquisition conditions Security of status Rights associated 
Armenia 76.25 80.00 91.67 50.00 83.33 
Australia 80.83 90.00 58.33 75.00 100.00 
Austria 40.83 30.00 33.33 50.00 50.00 
Belgium 68.33 65.00 66.67 75.00 66.67 
Bulgaria 51.25 30.00 75.00 50.00 50.00 
Canada 89.17 90.00 66.67 100.00 100.00 
Cyprus 39.17 15.00 50.00 50.00 41.67 
Czech Republic 66.46 70.00 66.67 62.50 66.67 
Denmark 36.99 20.00 36.31 50.00 41.67 
Estonia 64.79 55.00 75.00 62.50 66.67 
Finland 69.79 75.00 83.33 62.50 58.33 
France 51.61 35.00 33.93 62.50 75.00 
Germany 60.18 55.00 56.55 62.50 66.67 
Greece 49.17 30.00 50.00 50.00 66.67 
Hungary 60.63 80.00 75.00 37.50 50.00 
Ireland 33.75 35.00 58.33 25.00 16.67 
Italy 73.54 65.00 50.00 87.50 91.67 
Japan 51.46 60.00 66.67 37.50 41.67 
Latvia 46.25 60.00 66.67 0.00 58.33 
Lithuania 58.96 65.00 75.00 37.50 58.33 
Luxembourg 66.67 75.00 58.33 75.00 58.33 
Malta 48.13 30.00 50.00 62.50 50.00 
Netherlands 57.65 55.00 50.60 50.00 75.00 
Norway 67.50 70.00 45.83 62.50 91.67 




Portugal 90.63 100.00 83.33 87.50 91.67 
Romania 64.58 75.00 75.00 50.00 58.33 
Serbia 48.75 70.00 75.00 25.00 25.00 
Slovakia 52.92 70.00 58.33 50.00 33.33 
Slovenia 74.79 70.00 91.67 62.50 75.00 
South Korea 59.79 60.00 66.67 62.50 50.00 
Spain 84.58 80.00 83.33 100.00 75.00 
Sweden 84.38 100.00 58.33 87.50 91.67 
Switzerland 39.79 30.00 25.00 62.50 41.67 
Turkey 54.79 65.00 66.67 62.50 25.00 
UK 53.75 40.00 58.33 75.00 41.67 
USA 66.67 50.00 58.33 75.00 83.33 













 MIPEX: 2007 - 2009 
 Policy area: Education* 
 Education Access to education Targeting needs New opportunities Intercultural education 
Austria N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Belgium N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Canada N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Cyprus N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Czech Republic N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Denmark N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Estonia N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Finland N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
France N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Germany N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Greece N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Hungary N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Ireland N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Italy N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Latvia N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Lithuania N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Luxembourg N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Malta N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Netherlands N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Norway N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Poland N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Portugal N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Slovakia N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Slovenia N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 




Sweden N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
Switzerland N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
UK N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 
*Information about education policy indicators is not available for this period of time. 


















 MIPEX: 2010 - 2012 
 Policy area: Education 
 Education Access to education Targeting needs New opportunities Intercultural education 
Armenia 5.43 7.14 0.00 6.25 8.33 
Australia 72.02 71.43 66.67 75.00 75.00 
Austria 44.39 57.14 43.33 43.75 33.33 
Belgium 65.71 67.86 70.00 62.50 62.50 
Bulgaria 14.79 0.00 13.33 12.50 33.33 
Canada 70.86 64.29 90.00 62.50 66.67 
Cyprus 33.42 42.86 53.33 12.50 25.00 
Czech Republic 44.23 28.57 56.67 50.00 41.67 
Denmark 51.40 71.43 80.00 37.50 16.67 
Estonia 50.42 50.00 60.00 50.00 41.67 
Finland 63.50 78.57 90.00 43.75 41.67 
France 28.85 50.00 13.33 18.75 33.33 
Germany 43.21 42.86 30.00 50.00 50.00 
Greece 42.19 50.00 33.33 43.75 41.67 
Hungary 11.88 0.00 10.00 37.50 0.00 
Ireland 24.64 28.57 36.67 0.00 33.33 
Italy 40.60 35.71 60.00 25.00 41.67 
Japan 19.46 42.86 26.67 0.00 8.33 
Latvia 16.59 14.29 16.67 18.75 16.67 
Lithuania 17.20 7.14 36.67 0.00 25.00 
Luxembourg 51.70 64.29 46.67 37.50 58.33 
Malta 16.19 21.43 10.00 0.00 33.33 
Netherlands 50.74 57.14 50.00 12.50 83.33 
Norway 62.98 28.57 90.00 50.00 83.33 




Portugal 63.10 85.71 50.00 50.00 66.67 
Romania 19.70 7.14 63.33 0.00 8.33 
Serbia 17.26 35.71 0.00 0.00 33.33 
Slovakia 23.57 14.29 30.00 0.00 50.00 
Slovenia 24.33 28.57 16.67 18.75 33.33 
South Korea 56.31 78.57 63.33 50.00 33.33 
Spain 48.13 50.00 46.67 37.50 58.33 
Sweden 77.41 57.14 90.00 87.50 75.00 
Switzerland 44.55 35.71 46.67 62.50 33.33 
Turkey 2.92 0.00 3.33 0.00 8.33 
UK 57.72 57.14 63.33 18.75 91.67 
USA 54.66 85.71 60.00 31.25 41.67 













 MIPEX: 2007 - 2009 
 Policy area: Political Participation 
 Political participation Electoral rights Political liberties Consultative bodies Implementation policies 
Austria 32.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 30.00 
Belgium 61.04 16.67 100.00 37.50 90.00 
Canada 37.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 50.00 
Cyprus 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Republic 12.50 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 66.25 100.00 100.00 65.00 0.00 
Estonia 28.13 25.00 50.00 0.00 37.50 
Finland 86.88 100.00 100.00 67.50 80.00 
France 43.54 0.00 66.67 27.50 80.00 
Germany 64.38 0.00 100.00 67.50 90.00 
Greece 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Hungary 33.33 33.33 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Ireland 78.75 100.00 100.00 25.00 90.00 
Italy 49.79 0.00 66.67 52.50 80.00 
Latvia 17.50 0.00 50.00 0.00 20.00 
Lithuania 25.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Luxembourg 76.04 50.00 100.00 66.67 87.50 
Malta 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 79.38 100.00 100.00 30.00 87.50 
Norway 93.75 100.00 100.00 85.00 90.00 
Poland 12.50 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Portugal 68.96 33.33 100.00 42.50 100.00 
Slovakia 20.83 50.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 
Slovenia 27.92 25.00 66.67 0.00 20.00 




Sweden 75.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Switzerland 58.13 50.00 100.00 32.50 50.00 
UK 52.50 50.00 100.00 0.00 60.00 


















 MIPEX: 2010 - 2012 
 Policy area: Political Participation 
 Political participation Electoral rights Political liberties Consultative bodies Implementation policies 
Armenia 41.67 100.00 66.67 0.00 0.00 
Australia 59.17 16.67 100.00 30.00 90.00 
Austria 32.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 30.00 
Belgium 58.54 16.67 100.00 27.50 90.00 
Bulgaria 16.67 0.00 66.67 0.00 0.00 
Canada 37.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 50.00 
Cyprus 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Republic 12.50 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 61.88 100.00 100.00 47.50 0.00 
Estonia 28.13 25.00 50.00 0.00 37.50 
Finland 86.88 100.00 100.00 67.50 80.00 
France 43.54 0.00 66.67 27.50 80.00 
Germany 64.38 0.00 100.00 67.50 90.00 
Greece 39.58 33.33 100.00 15.00 10.00 
Hungary 33.33 33.33 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Ireland 78.75 100.00 100.00 25.00 90.00 
Italy 49.79 0.00 66.67 52.50 80.00 
Japan 27.08 0.00 83.33 25.00 0.00 
Latvia 17.50 0.00 50.00 0.00 20.00 
Lithuania 25.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Luxembourg 77.71 50.00 100.00 73.33 87.50 
Malta 25.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 79.38 100.00 100.00 30.00 87.50 
Norway 93.75 100.00 100.00 85.00 90.00 




Portugal 70.21 33.33 100.00 47.50 100.00 
Romania 8.33 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 
Serbia 12.50 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Slovakia 20.83 50.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 
Slovenia 27.92 25.00 66.67 0.00 20.00 
South Korea 60.00 66.67 33.33 40.00 100.00 
Spain 55.83 33.33 100.00 50.00 40.00 
Sweden 75.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Switzerland 58.75 50.00 100.00 35.00 50.00 
Turkey 12.71 0.00 33.33 7.50 10.00 
UK 52.50 50.00 100.00 0.00 60.00 
USA 45.42 16.67 100.00 15.00 50.00 













 MIPEX: 2007 - 2009 
 Policy area: Long term residence 
 Long term residence Eligibility Acquisition conditions Security of status Associated rights 
Austria 54.17 41.67 37.50 50.00 87.50 
Belgium 64.14 8.33 62.50 85.71 100.00 
Canada 59.75 66.67 34.82 50.00 87.50 
Cyprus 40.63 25.00 37.50 50.00 50.00 
Czech Republic 65.18 50.00 75.00 35.71 100.00 
Denmark 63.91 83.33 34.82 50.00 87.50 
Estonia 68.30 50.00 58.93 64.29 100.00 
Finland 58.48 25.00 50.00 71.43 87.50 
France 45.61 8.33 45.54 78.57 50.00 
Germany 50.30 33.33 8.93 71.43 87.50 
Greece 56.10 58.33 21.43 57.14 87.50 
Hungary 53.72 41.67 50.00 35.71 87.50 
Ireland 42.56 41.67 50.00 28.57 50.00 
Italy 69.20 25.00 87.50 64.29 100.00 
Latvia 50.52 33.33 40.18 28.57 100.00 
Lithuania 56.70 50.00 46.43 42.86 87.50 
Luxembourg 56.85 66.67 75.00 35.71 50.00 
Malta 64.29 50.00 50.00 57.14 100.00 
Netherlands 67.93 58.33 47.32 78.57 87.50 
Norway 61.09 41.67 43.75 71.43 87.50 
Poland 65.33 41.67 75.00 57.14 87.50 
Portugal 55.21 33.33 50.00 50.00 87.50 
Slovakia 50.22 50.00 40.18 35.71 75.00 
Slovenia 68.90 41.67 75.00 71.43 87.50 




Sweden 77.68 75.00 50.00 85.71 100.00 
Switzerland 41.37 8.33 12.50 57.14 87.50 
UK 74.11 75.00 62.50 71.43 87.50 


















 MIPEX: 2010 - 2012 
 Policy area: Long term residence 
 Long term residence Eligibility Acquisition conditions Security of status Associated rights 
Armenia 64.58 33.33 100.00 50.00 75.00 
Australia 60.79 83.33 33.04 64.29 62.50 
Austria 58.33 58.33 37.50 50.00 87.50 
Belgium 78.72 41.67 87.50 85.71 100.00 
Bulgaria 56.85 41.67 62.50 35.71 87.50 
Canada 62.87 66.67 34.82 50.00 100.00 
Cyprus 36.83 25.00 22.32 50.00 50.00 
Czech Republic 64.73 50.00 73.21 35.71 100.00 
Denmark 65.85 100.00 33.04 42.86 87.50 
Estonia 66.52 50.00 58.93 57.14 100.00 
Finland 58.48 25.00 50.00 71.43 87.50 
France 45.61 8.33 45.54 78.57 50.00 
Germany 50.07 33.33 8.04 71.43 87.50 
Greece 56.32 58.33 22.32 57.14 87.50 
Hungary 59.97 41.67 75.00 35.71 87.50 
Ireland 42.56 41.67 50.00 28.57 50.00 
Italy 65.63 25.00 73.21 64.29 100.00 
Japan 58.04 50.00 37.50 57.14 87.50 
Latvia 58.85 66.67 40.18 28.57 100.00 
Lithuania 56.70 50.00 46.43 42.86 87.50 
Luxembourg 55.80 25.00 75.00 35.71 87.50 
Malta 64.29 50.00 50.00 57.14 100.00 
Netherlands 67.93 58.33 47.32 78.57 87.50 
Norway 61.09 41.67 43.75 71.43 87.50 




Portugal 68.53 50.00 52.68 71.43 100.00 
Romania 54.17 41.67 44.64 42.86 87.50 
Serbia 51.34 50.00 62.50 42.86 50.00 
Slovakia 50.22 50.00 40.18 35.71 75.00 
Slovenia 68.90 41.67 75.00 71.43 87.50 
South Korea 62.20 41.67 50.00 57.14 100.00 
Spain 77.53 58.33 87.50 64.29 100.00 
Sweden 77.68 75.00 50.00 85.71 100.00 
Switzerland 41.37 8.33 12.50 57.14 87.50 
Turkey 32.74 41.67 37.50 14.29 37.50 
UK 31.47 0.00 16.96 21.43 87.50 
USA 49.55 50.00 50.00 35.71 62.50 













 MIPEX: 2007 - 2009 
 Policy area: Nationality 
 Access to nationality Eligibility Acquisition conditions Security status Dual nationality 
Austria 21.61 20.00 27.14 14.29 25.00 
Belgium 68.57 60.00 71.43 42.86 100.00 
Canada 74.46 95.00 67.14 35.71 100.00 
Cyprus 31.96 35.00 35.71 7.14 50.00 
Czech Republic 33.39 0.00 51.43 57.14 25.00 
Denmark 33.10 40.00 24.52 42.86 25.00 
Estonia 15.24 10.00 29.52 21.43 0.00 
Finland 54.29 55.00 47.86 64.29 50.00 
France 58.99 75.00 25.24 35.71 100.00 
Germany 52.02 90.00 18.10 50.00 50.00 
Greece 18.27 5.00 18.10 0.00 50.00 
Hungary 27.86 0.00 40.00 21.43 50.00 
Ireland 60.00 90.00 35.71 14.29 100.00 
Italy 64.64 30.00 57.14 71.43 100.00 
Latvia 15.89 0.00 38.57 0.00 25.00 
Lithuania 19.82 20.00 52.14 7.14 0.00 
Luxembourg 34.29 40.00 82.86 14.29 0.00 
Malta 25.54 15.00 30.00 7.14 50.00 
Netherlands 65.12 75.00 46.19 64.29 75.00 
Norway 40.71 20.00 67.86 50.00 25.00 
Poland 35.00 15.00 57.14 42.86 25.00 
Portugal 81.96 90.00 80.71 57.14 100.00 
Slovakia 38.57 10.00 44.29 50.00 50.00 
Slovenia 32.68 10.00 67.14 28.57 25.00 




Sweden 79.29 60.00 71.43 85.71 100.00 
Switzerland 35.54 35.00 0.00 57.14 50.00 
UK 75.24 100.00 58.10 42.86 100.00 


















 MIPEX: 2010 - 2012 
 Policy area: Nationality 
 Access to nationality Eligibility Acquisition conditions Security status Dual nationality 
Armenia 41.31 40.00 53.81 21.43 50.00 
Australia 77.44 95.00 57.62 57.14 100.00 
Austria 21.61 20.00 27.14 14.29 25.00 
Belgium 68.57 60.00 71.43 42.86 100.00 
Bulgaria 23.93 0.00 67.14 28.57 0.00 
Canada 74.46 95.00 67.14 35.71 100.00 
Cyprus 31.96 35.00 35.71 7.14 50.00 
Czech Republic 33.39 0.00 51.43 57.14 25.00 
Denmark 33.10 40.00 24.52 42.86 25.00 
Estonia 15.54 10.00 30.71 21.43 0.00 
Finland 56.79 65.00 47.86 64.29 50.00 
France 58.99 75.00 25.24 35.71 100.00 
Germany 59.23 90.00 32.62 64.29 50.00 
Greece 56.79 75.00 45.00 7.14 100.00 
Hungary 31.43 0.00 40.00 35.71 50.00 
Ireland 58.21 90.00 28.57 14.29 100.00 
Italy 62.86 30.00 50.00 71.43 100.00 
Japan 32.86 40.00 41.43 50.00 0.00 
Latvia 15.42 0.00 36.67 0.00 25.00 
Lithuania 19.82 20.00 52.14 7.14 0.00 
Luxembourg 74.05 70.00 69.05 57.14 100.00 
Malta 25.54 15.00 30.00 7.14 50.00 
Netherlands 65.60 75.00 48.10 64.29 75.00 
Norway 40.71 20.00 67.86 50.00 25.00 




Portugal 81.96 90.00 80.71 57.14 100.00 
Romania 29.11 25.00 12.86 28.57 50.00 
Serbia 47.86 20.00 71.43 50.00 50.00 
Slovakia 26.67 10.00 25.24 21.43 50.00 
Slovenia 32.68 10.00 67.14 28.57 25.00 
South Korea 44.76 30.00 38.33 35.71 75.00 
Spain 38.63 40.00 25.24 64.29 25.00 
Sweden 79.29 60.00 71.43 85.71 100.00 
Switzerland 35.54 35.00 0.00 57.14 50.00 
Turkey 32.38 40.00 25.24 14.29 50.00 
UK 59.35 65.00 29.52 42.86 100.00 
USA 61.13 80.00 35.95 28.57 100.00 













 MIPEX: 2007 - 2009 











Austria 39.98 57.14 8.33 50.00 44.44 
Belgium 69.54 64.29 83.33 75.00 55.56 
Canada 89.24 100.00 100.00 62.50 94.44 
Cyprus 59.33 42.86 100.00 50.00 44.44 
Czech Republic 20.09 42.86 8.33 29.17 0.00 
Denmark 41.67 50.00 50.00 50.00 16.67 
Estonia 18.15 14.29 8.33 33.33 16.67 
Finland 76.59 78.57 100.00 66.67 61.11 
France 74.45 71.43 100.00 70.83 55.56 
Germany 47.92 50.00 75.00 50.00 16.67 
Greece 49.65 50.00 50.00 54.17 44.44 
Hungary 75.35 50.00 100.00 79.17 72.22 
Ireland 54.51 50.00 66.67 45.83 55.56 
Italy 61.56 64.29 100.00 70.83 11.11 
Latvia 24.85 28.57 8.33 29.17 33.33 
Lithuania 49.50 78.57 33.33 25.00 61.11 
Luxembourg 46.53 50.00 50.00 58.33 27.78 
Malta 27.03 42.86 8.33 45.83 11.11 
Netherlands 67.51 71.43 66.67 87.50 44.44 
Norway 59.42 57.14 50.00 58.33 72.22 
Poland 34.72 50.00 16.67 50.00 22.22 
Portugal 83.78 64.29 100.00 87.50 83.33 
Slovakia 47.32 64.29 25.00 66.67 33.33 




Spain 48.66 57.14 50.00 54.17 33.33 
Sweden 87.70 78.57 100.00 83.33 88.89 
Switzerland 30.61 57.14 0.00 37.50 27.78 
UK 81.50 85.71 100.00 62.50 77.78 


















 MIPEX: 2010 - 2012 











Armenia 26.04 50.00 8.33 45.83 0.00 
Australia 68.80 57.14 58.33 87.50 72.22 
Austria 33.04 57.14 8.33 50.00 16.67 
Belgium 78.67 78.57 100.00 75.00 61.11 
Bulgaria 79.66 71.43 100.00 75.00 72.22 
Canada 89.24 100.00 100.00 62.50 94.44 
Cyprus 59.33 42.86 100.00 50.00 44.44 
Czech Republic 44.49 57.14 50.00 54.17 16.67 
Denmark 46.53 50.00 50.00 58.33 27.78 
Estonia 31.55 42.86 8.33 41.67 33.33 
Finland 77.98 78.57 100.00 66.67 66.67 
France 76.98 85.71 100.00 66.67 55.56 
Germany 47.92 50.00 75.00 50.00 16.67 
Greece 49.65 50.00 50.00 54.17 44.44 
Hungary 75.35 50.00 100.00 79.17 72.22 
Ireland 62.85 50.00 100.00 45.83 55.56 
Italy 61.56 64.29 100.00 70.83 11.11 
Japan 13.64 14.29 0.00 29.17 11.11 
Latvia 24.85 28.57 8.33 29.17 33.33 
Lithuania 54.71 78.57 33.33 45.83 61.11 
Luxembourg 47.57 50.00 50.00 62.50 27.78 
Malta 36.16 57.14 8.33 62.50 16.67 
Netherlands 67.51 71.43 66.67 87.50 44.44 




Poland 35.76 50.00 16.67 54.17 22.22 
Portugal 83.78 64.29 100.00 87.50 83.33 
Romania 72.62 57.14 100.00 83.33 50.00 
Serbia 76.29 85.71 100.00 75.00 44.44 
Slovakia 58.83 71.43 50.00 75.00 38.89 
Slovenia 66.42 64.29 100.00 62.50 38.89 
South Korea 53.67 28.57 100.00 41.67 44.44 
Spain 48.66 57.14 50.00 54.17 33.33 
Sweden 87.70 78.57 100.00 83.33 88.89 
Switzerland 30.61 57.14 0.00 37.50 27.78 
Turkey 24.26 42.86 16.67 20.83 16.67 
UK 86.11 100.00 100.00 66.67 77.78 
USA 88.54 100.00 100.00 87.50 66.67 













Observation Country Year IS ALM SLR AN 
1 Armenia 2010 -0.0029550 80 50 41 
2 Armenia 2011 -0.0007398 80 50 41 
3 Armenia 2012 -0.0007308 80 50 41 
4 Australia 2010 -0.0093763 70 64 77 
5 Australia 2011 -0.0075728 70 64 77 
6 Australia 2012 -0.0076300 70 64 77 
7 Austria 2007 -0.0046898 50 50 22 
8 Austria 2008 -0.0023719 50 50 22 
9 Austria 2009 -0.0044060 50 50 22 
10 Austria 2010 -0.0001411 50 50 22 
11 Austria 2011 -0.0035632 50 50 22 
12 Austria 2012 -0.0020183 50 50 22 
13 Belgium 2007 -0.0017058 40 86 69 
14 Belgium 2008 -0.0003545 40 86 69 
15 Belgium 2009 -0.0013039 40 86 69 
16 Belgium 2010 -0.0061812 40 86 69 
17 Belgium 2011 0.0002437 40 86 69 
18 Belgium 2012 -0.0002365 40 86 69 
19 Bulgaria 2010 0.0000542 70 36 24 
20 Bulgaria 2011 0.0000140 70 36 24 
21 Bulgaria 2012 -0.0000016 70 36 24 
22 Canada 2007 -0.0104227 90 50 74 
23 Canada 2008 -0.0173557 90 50 74 
24 Canada 2009 -0.0091817 90 50 74 
25 Canada 2010 -0.0484483 90 50 74 
26 Canada 2011 -0.0112087 90 50 74 
27 Canada 2012 -0.0064283 90 50 74 
28 Cyprus 2007 -0.0025342 0 50 32 
29 Cyprus 2008 -0.0012548 0 50 32 
30 Cyprus 2009 -0.0023022 0 50 32 
31 Cyprus 2010 -0.0042280 0 50 32 
32 Cyprus 2011 -0.0005296 0 50 32 
33 Cyprus 2012 -0.0042107 0 50 32 
34 Czech republic 2007 -0.0000109 90 36 33 
35 Czech republic 2008 -0.0000140 90 36 33 
36 Czech republic 2009 0.0001484 90 36 33 
37 Czech republic 2010 0.0000213 90 36 33 
38 Czech republic 2011 0.0000550 90 36 33 




40 Denmark 2007 -0.0000062 80 50 33 
41 Denmark 2008 -0.0006339 80 50 33 
42 Denmark 2009 0.0004655 80 50 33 
43 Denmark 2010 0.0006541 80 43 33 
44 Denmark 2011 0.0000235 80 43 33 
45 Denmark 2012 0.0005312 80 43 33 
46 Estonia 2007 -0.0000924 40 64 15 
47 Estonia 2008 -0.0006804 40 64 15 
48 Estonia 2009 0.0034247 40 64 15 
49 Estonia 2010 0.0047055 40 57 16 
50 Estonia 2011 -0.0020576 40 57 16 
51 Estonia 2012 0.0005016 40 57 16 
52 Finland 2007 -0.0000542 80 71 54 
53 Finland 2008 -0.0000782 80 71 54 
54 Finland 2009 0.0002237 80 71 54 
55 Finland 2010 0.0000540 80 71 57 
56 Finland 2011 -0.0000756 80 71 57 
57 Finland 2012 -0.0001407 80 71 57 
58 France 2007 -0.0007741 20 79 59 
59 France 2008 -0.0006832 20 79 59 
60 France 2009 -0.0021623 20 79 59 
61 France 2010 -0.0007369 20 79 59 
62 France 2011 -0.0002193 20 79 59 
63 France 2012 -0.0020867 20 79 59 
64 Germany 2007 -0.0013338 70 71 52 
65 Germany 2008 -0.0004521 70 71 52 
66 Germany 2009 0.0008167 70 71 52 
67 Germany 2010 -0.0000334 70 71 59 
68 Germany 2011 -0.0018221 70 71 59 
69 Germany 2012 -0.0005061 70 71 59 
70 Greece 2007 -0.0000596 70 71 18 
71 Greece 2008 -0.0008935 70 71 18 
72 Greece 2009 -0.0003362 70 71 18 
73 Greece 2010 -0.0000967 40 57 57 
74 Greece 2011 -0.0001618 40 57 57 
75 Greece 2012 0.0000432 40 57 57 
76 Hungary 2007 0.0000074 50 36 28 
77 Hungary 2008 0.0000243 50 36 28 
78 Hungary 2009 0.0000006 50 36 28 
79 Hungary 2010 -0.0002262 70 36 31 
80 Hungary 2011 -0.0000697 70 36 31 
81 Hungary 2012 0.0000981 70 36 31 




83 Ireland 2008 -0.0010238 40 29 60 
84 Ireland 2009 -0.0053928 40 29 60 
85 Ireland 2010 0.0095779 40 29 58 
86 Ireland 2011 -0.0080488 40 29 58 
87 Ireland 2012 -0.0019363 40 29 58 
88 Italy 2007 -0.0001393 80 64 65 
89 Italy 2008 -0.0003882 80 64 65 
90 Italy 2009 0.0003949 80 64 65 
91 Italy 2010 0.0000631 80 64 63 
92 Italy 2011 -0.0001050 80 64 63 
93 Italy 2012 -0.0041775 80 64 63 
94 Japan 2010 -0.0000013 80 57 33 
95 Japan 2011 0.0000201 80 57 33 
96 Japan 2012 0.0000035 80 57 33 
97 Latvia 2007 -0.0005028 30 29 16 
98 Latvia 2008 -0.0007002 30 29 16 
99 Latvia 2009 0.0094960 30 29 16 
100 Latvia 2010 -0.0329620 30 29 15 
101 Latvia 2011 0.0147080 30 29 15 
102 Latvia 2012 -0.0005597 30 29 15 
103 Lithuania 2007 -0.0000236 60 43 20 
104 Lithuania 2008 -0.0000254 60 43 20 
105 Lithuania 2009 0.0001410 60 43 20 
106 Lithuania 2010 -0.0001566 60 43 20 
107 Lithuania 2011 0.0010657 60 43 20 
108 Lithuania 2012 0.0000272 60 43 20 
109 Luxembourg 2007 -0.0091834 20 36 34 
110 Luxembourg 2008 -0.0448502 20 36 34 
111 Luxembourg 2009 -0.0810221 20 36 34 
112 Luxembourg 2010 -0.0182896 20 36 74 
113 Luxembourg 2011 -0.0348876 20 36 74 
114 Luxembourg 2012 -0.0380421 20 36 74 
115 Malta 2007 -0.0002291 80 57 26 
116 Malta 2008 -0.0000468 80 57 26 
117 Malta 2009 -0.0001435 80 57 26 
118 Malta 2010 -0.0001428 60 57 26 
119 Malta 2011 -0.0000632 60 57 26 
120 Malta 2012 -0.0002452 60 57 26 
121 Netherlands 2007 -0.0001047 100 79 65 
122 Netherlands 2008 -0.0003959 100 79 65 
123 Netherlands 2009 -0.0009295 100 79 65 
124 Netherlands 2010 -0.0011025 100 79 66 




126 Netherlands 2012 -0.0007758 100 79 66 
127 Norway 2007 -0.0007431 80 71 41 
128 Norway 2008 -0.0026598 80 71 41 
129 Norway 2009 0.0000808 80 71 41 
130 Norway 2010 -0.0000853 80 71 41 
131 Norway 2011 -0.0003373 80 71 41 
132 Norway 2012 -0.0004540 80 71 41 
133 Poland 2007 0.0000001 40 57 35 
134 Poland 2008 -0.0000182 40 57 35 
135 Poland 2009 0.0000127 40 57 35 
136 Poland 2010 -0.0000160 50 57 35 
137 Poland 2011 -0.0000494 50 57 35 
138 Poland 2012 -0.0000854 50 57 35 
139 Portugal 2007 -0.0001399 100 50 82 
140 Portugal 2008 -0.0000410 100 50 82 
141 Portugal 2009 0.0006098 100 50 82 
142 Portugal 2010 -0.0002703 100 71 82 
143 Portugal 2011 0.0026425 100 71 82 
144 Portugal 2012 -0.0003601 100 71 82 
145 Romania 2010 -0.0000004 50 43 29 
146 Romania 2011 0.0000011 50 43 29 
147 Romania 2012 0.0000011 50 43 29 
148 Serbia 2010 0.0022086 70 43 48 
149 Serbia 2011 0.0009361 70 43 48 
150 Serbia 2012 0.0001926 70 43 48 
151 Slovakia 2007 -0.0000003 0 36 39 
152 Slovakia 2008 -0.0000211 0 36 39 
153 Slovakia 2009 0.0000087 0 36 39 
154 Slovakia 2010 -0.0000279 0 36 27 
155 Slovakia 2011 0.0000194 0 36 27 
156 Slovakia 2012 -0.0000563 0 36 27 
157 Slovenia 2007 -0.0005210 40 71 33 
158 Slovenia 2008 0.0000993 40 71 33 
159 Slovenia 2009 -0.0011007 40 71 33 
160 Slovenia 2010 -0.0000220 40 71 33 
161 Slovenia 2011 0.0050025 40 71 33 
162 Slovenia 2012 0.0003020 40 71 33 
163 South Korea 2010 -0.0000539 70 57 45 
164 South Korea 2011 -0.0000527 70 57 45 
165 South Korea 2012 -0.0000397 70 57 45 
166 Spain 2007 -0.0025492 80 57 39 
167 Spain 2008 -0.0020292 80 57 39 




169 Spain 2010 -0.0010229 100 64 39 
170 Spain 2011 -0.0007158 100 64 39 
171 Spain 2012 -0.0002112 100 64 39 
172 Sweden 2007 -0.0015319 100 86 79 
173 Sweden 2008 -0.0082177 100 86 79 
174 Sweden 2009 0.0001845 100 86 79 
175 Sweden 2010 -0.0003907 100 86 79 
176 Sweden 2011 -0.0010102 100 86 79 
177 Sweden 2012 -0.0007653 100 86 79 
178 Switzerland 2007 0.0290336 60 57 36 
179 Switzerland 2008 -0.0124131 60 57 36 
180 Switzerland 2009 -0.0045649 60 57 36 
181 Switzerland 2010 -0.0011038 60 57 36 
182 Switzerland 2011 -0.0016935 60 57 36 
183 Switzerland 2012 -0.0013222 60 57 36 
184 Turkey 2010 -0.0000067 0 14 32 
185 Turkey 2011 0.0000165 0 14 32 
186 Turkey 2012 -0.0000024 0 14 32 
187 United Kingdom 2007 -0.0001660 80 71 75 
188 United Kingdom 2008 0.0002944 80 71 75 
189 United Kingdom 2009 0.0001333 80 71 75 
190 United Kingdom 2010 -0.0001506 80 21 59 
191 United Kingdom 2011 0.0018190 80 21 59 
192 United Kingdom 2012 -0.0003444 80 21 59 
193 United States 2010 0.0001974 100 36 61 
194 United States 2011 0.0001719 100 36 61 
195 United States 2012 -0.0003712 100 36 61 
Source: Own computations based on World Bank Data Base, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 
OECD Statistics, National Service of Republic of Armenia, Eurostat, Cekos in, World Development Indicators 
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